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Walsh: Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not Specifically Conferred

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM
EXERCISE OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
NOT "SPECIFICALLY" CONFERRED
INTRODUCTION:
IF THIS BE TREASON ...
ROBERT K. WALSH*
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should ....
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution. (Marshall, C.J., in Cohens v. Virginia).'
Justice Marshall thought it treason to a federal judge's oath either to take
jurisdiction that is not granted or to refuse jurisdiction that is. As to the
first, strictly speaking, it cannot happen. It involves a paradox. Since
judges interpret the Constitution, they cannot exercise jurisdiction not constitutionally conferred. By the process of interpretation, they can simply
find that jurisdiction is conferred. Yet, over the years through this process
of interpretation, it must be admitted that the federal courts have on occasion taken an expansive view in finding jurisdiction. As to declining jurisdiction, the federal courts have quite frankly refused to hear cases admittedly within their jurisdiction. Whether the federal courts have thus committed treason to their constitutional responsibilities, however, depends on
whether they have taken these actions on a principled basis and whether
the principles are valid.
Jurisdiction Not "Specifically" Conferred: Usurpation or Interpretation

Certainly, the federal courts exercise jurisdiction not specifically spelled
out in the Constitution. They hear pendent and ancillary matters; they
hear cases removed from the state courts under the removal statutes; they
hear matters arising under the "federal common law." Yet, none of these
jurisdictions are "expressly" provided for in the Constitution. Neither are
* Professor of Law, Villanova University College of Law; B.A.,
College; J.D., Harvard University.
1. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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they expressly forbidden. "The constitution unavoidably deals in general
language."'2 Its writers provided that the federal judicial power should extend to nine types of cases and controversies where they thought there
would be a national interest in the availability of a federal judiciary. But
the writers of article III did not attempt to foresee every possible need for
a federal tribunal and then exhaustively provide by express conferral for
such jurisdictions in the Constitution. In light of the intended lasting nature
of the document, jurisdiction can be legitimately "implied" by interpreting
the express grants of jurisdiction consistent with their purposes.
For instance, in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,3 the Supreme Court
found jurisdiction under the Constitution over state claims that "derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact ' 4 with a federal question. There is no
express mention of such a jurisdiction over state claims in article III. That
article, however, does confer jurisdiction over all cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States. It does not simply confer jurisdiction over federal issues. It is legitimate, therefore, to give a purposive
meaning to the constitutional language, to say that the related claims "comprise but one constitutional 'case.' " Such an interpretation carries out the
purposes for granting federal question jurisdiction. If a litigant has a
grievance that requires a sympathetic federal tribunal or a tribunal with
expertise in federal law, such a grievance should have access to the federal
courts. Without a doctrine like pendent jurisdiction, however, many litigants would forego the federal courts if the grievance involves related state
claims. They (and the courts) could not afford the wasteful duplication
of time and resources where both courts must hear and decide the same
matters. To allow such cases the realistic option of a federal forum, the
Supreme Court gave its pragmatic interpretation of an article III "case" in
Gibbs, while at the same time providing a discretionary flexibility" to avoid
unnecessary applications of the doctrine where it would enter into state
matters without significantly advancing federal interests.
Another instance of the Supreme Court interpreting article III to imply
jurisdiction not expressly spelled out therein occurred recently in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee.7 In that case, the Court held that a suit brought by
Illinois against four Wisconsin cities and two local sewerage commissions to
2. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
3. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
4. Id. at 725.
5. Id. at 725.
6. The Court made itclear that the power to hear pendent state claims "is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." The trial court should look to "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness' to litigants" and avoid "[need-

less decisions of state law." Id. at 726. This discretion recognized in Gibbs is another

example of doctrines, discussed p. 517 inIra, by which the federal courts refuse foi
policy reasons to exercise jurisdiction constitutionally granted in certain situations.
7. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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abate pollution of interstate waters was controlled by federal common law
and that such a claim "arises under" federal "law" for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction. 8 Again, neither the Constitution nor the federal statutes expressly refer to a federal common law. But the federal courts have
developed judge-made federal law in certain circumstances where they felt
federal interests required it. 9 In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, for instance,
at issue was the source of legal standards to govern a dispute between a
state and municipalities of another state over use of interstate waters. Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute specifically provided an answer
to the dispute. Yet, in terms of alternative sources of law, it would clearly
be inappropriate to solve such disputes fairly and acceptably to all parties
by using the law of either state as the governing law. Once it is decided
that a federal common law should govern, then it is certainly appropriate
to provide a federal forum to formulate the contours of the governing law
and to hold that "laws of the United States" in the Constitution and the statute should be interpreted to encompass "federal common law."
Indeed, such a process is no different than that required to conclude that
a case founded on a federal statute is one "arising under . . . the [l]aws
the United States."' 10 Every claim of federal jurisdiction requires interpretation of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Some questions of interpretation are simply easier than others. The focus should be on whether the
interpretation is legitimate in light of the purposes of the grant of federal
jurisdiction."
Declining Jurisdiction: Young, Younger, and Beyond
A famous case in which the Supreme Court has been accused of usurping
12
jurisdiction seemingly forbidden by the Constitution is Ex parte Young.
In that decision, railroad stockholders sought in the federal courts to enjoin
the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforcing state laws reducing the
railroad's rates on the ground that such state laws violated the 14th amendment. The Attorney General contended that such a suit was barred by the
11th amendment. The Supreme Court could have met the 11 th amendment
argument by process of interpretation. 3 Instead, the Court engaged in the
8. Id. at 99-100, citing Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
9. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1512

(1969).
10. E.g., Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421 (1883).
11. For an excellent analysis of the problems of interpreting the federal question
jurisdiction grant in light of its purposes, see Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Re-

quirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890

(1967).

12. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

13. Since the 14th amendment followed the 11th by 70 years, Justice Peckham
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legal fiction that when the Attorney General of Minnesota was acting un-

constitutionally, he was "the state" for purposes of the 14th amendment
but not for purposes of the 11 th.
Pragmatically, the doctrine of Ex parte Young 14 is indispensable to one

of the basic functions of the federal courts-providing a sympathetic forum
for vindication of federal constitutional rights abridged by state officials.'
However, because of the "logic" of the decision and the possible resulting
friction with legitimate state interests, the doctrine was subsequently limited
by Congress" 6 and the federal courts themselves. Responding to the problems posed by the assumption of authority in Young, the Supreme Court
later developed doctrines under which the federal courts would decline
to exercise the authority in certain circumstances.' 7 The abstention' s and
other doctrines' 9 in which the federal courts admittedly "decline the exer-

cise of jurisdiction which is given" seem exactly what Marshall condemned
in Cohens.
Whether a federal court's abstaining is treason to its constitutional responsibility, however, depends on whether article III defines an irreducible
minimum of federal court responsibility in exercising "the judicial power."
This is not at all a necessary interpretation. The Constitution defines the
maximum power of all three branches in creating a government of limited
could have held that the drafters of the 14th intended that the rights granted under the
14th modified the immunity granted by the l1th. But he did not.
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
15. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
16. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342 (1970) (forbidding federal district court intervention in certain state ratemaking and tax matters); 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (requiring a three-judge court where an injunction is asked against enforcement of a state
statute upon the ground of unconstitutionality); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (the AntiInjunction Statute).
17. In addition to the abstention doctrines discussed later the Supreme Court also
developed the rule that a litigant must normally exhaust state administrative remedies
before challenging state action in federal court. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
211 U.S. 210 (1908).
18. There is more than one ,-1stention doctrine. See geneially C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 52 (1970).
In the :ind of abstent:.n involved in Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), it should be noted that the federal courts do not
absolutely decline jurisdiction. The normal procedure is to retain jurisdiction until a
decision is received from the state court on the state issues involved. Of this type of
abstention, the Supreme Court has stated "this principle does not, of course, involve
the abdication of federal jurisdiction but only the postponement of its exercise."
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167. 177 (1959). The resulting delay and expense inxolved in this type of abstention, however, can effectively render the right to go to
federal court illusory. See United States v. Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965).
19. In addition to the abstention doctrines, there are many other doctrines, not
discussed in this introduction, by which the federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction
admittedly present. For instance, discretion to dismiss pendent claims, the discretionany doctrines of justiciability, the doctrine of exclusive primary jurisdiction, and the
requirement of exhausting state remedies, all involve the refusal to exercise jurisdiction
on policy grounds in various circumstances.
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powers. 20 With respect to the other branches where it gives authority in
an area, it is not thought to always require exercise of all that authority to
preempt state activity in the same area. For instance, the mere existence of
the federal legislative commerce clause power does not necessarily preclude
state responsibility in the area. 21 The Constitution in fact envisions that
22
state courts may have concurrent responsibility in some constitutional cases,
and article III power must be viewed in the context of the overall compromise between legitimate federal and state interests in the creation of a
national system of courts. That compromise is not absolutely static, frozen
as of 1789. Congress can affect it by legislation, such as the Anti-Injunction
Statute.23 As long as the essential role of the federal courts is preserved,
the courts should also be able to administer the compromise with some
flexibility in a federal system in flux. Balancing state interests in particular
cases against any harm done to the function of the federal courts, the Supreme Court seemingly has opted for a flexible, continuing compromise between state. and federal interests rather than an absolute and fixed one.
An example of the Supreme Court's flexible approach is seen in the recent development of the law concerning permissible federal intervention in
state criminal proceedings. In 1965, essentially non-violent civil rights
demonstrations for racial equality were at their height. It was charged that
state officials were using the threat of criminal prosecutions to discourage
such protests and that state courts were not protecting federal rights. 2 4 In
this context, the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister25 stated that the
federal courts could modify the basic rules of equity and federalism prohibiting federal courts from interference with threatened state criminal prosecutions 26 in two circumstances: "where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities." 2 7 The alternative ground for intervention when a statute is attacked on its face was new and of significant
20. It is axiomatic, of course, that the federal courts cannot exercise jurisdiction

not granted in the Constitution even if granted in a federal statute. Hodgson v.
Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 310 (1809); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 49, 69 (1803).
21. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rlv. 1
(1940).
22. See U.S. CONST.art. VI.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). This statute forbids federal injunctions against
state proceedings with three limited exceptions. For recent discussions of the excep-

tions, see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281
(1970); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

The Supreme Court has stated its

purpose to be "to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts." Oklahoma
Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940).

24. See. Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social
Change: Reflections from Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. Rev. 237, 253-54 (1970).

25. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
27. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 489-90 (1965) (emphasis added).
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potential for increased judicial intervention by the lower federal courts.-"
When the peak of such demonstrations had passed, however, the Court in
1971 in Younger v. Harris29 and companion cases 30 "clarified" its earlier
holding in Dombrowski. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated that
while some language in Dombrowski might lend itself to the interpretation

that the Court had substantially broadened the availability of intervention
against state criminal prosecution by adding an independent ground for

intervention-denominated the "chilling effect"-such language was unnecessary to the opinion and the existence of a chilling effect "should not by
itself justify federal intervention."' 31 Yet, even in Younger and its companion cases, the Court did not draw an absolute line, freezing federal
court intervention against overbroad statutes only to situations where plain-

tiffs could prove bad faith under the heavy standard of Cameron v. Johnson.32

Justice Black left two questions for possible further development:

(1) "the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is
no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding
is begun"3 3 and (2) whether "extraordinary circumstances" calling for federal intervention in the future might arise. 34

Further, Justice Brennan, in

his opinions in the cases, suggested that declaratory, as opposed to injunctive
relief, might be proper where state prosecutions are threatened, but not yet
28. After Dombrowski, federal intervention in state matters increased. See Sedler,
The Dombrowski-Type Suits as an Effective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections
from Without and Within, 18 KAN. L. REV. 237, 261-62 (1970). The Supreme Court's
alarm at the possible overcongestion of the federal courts has certainly affected the
Court's decisions in past cases on whether to accept or find jurisdiction. Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906). See Cohen,
The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal
Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967).

29. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

30. See Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
31. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 50 (1971).
32. 390 U.S. 611 (1968). In Cameron, the Court, much to Justice Fortas' chagrin,
upheld the trial judge's finding that the state officials were not proceeding in bad faith,
stating: "the question was whether the statute was enforced against them with no
expectation of convictions but onhy to discourage exercise of protected rights." Id. at
621.
33. Despite the fact that the Court was interpreting the meaning of a case in
which no prosecution was pending, Dombrowski, Justice Black said at the beginning
of the opinion: "We express no view about the circumstances under which federal
courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the
federal proceeding is begun." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1968).
34. At the end of the opinion, Justice Black stated: "There may, of course, be
extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown
even in the absence of the usual prerequisite of bad faith and harassment." Justice
Black thought that such a circumstance might be found where a statute is " 'flagrantly
and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions.'"
He closed: "Other
unusual sitations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there is no point
in our attempting now to specify what they might be." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
53-54 (1968).
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pending.35 Together with the holding a year later in Mitchum v. Foster 6
that the federal Anti-Injunction Statute is not an absolute bar to federal intervention where actions are brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,31
even where state prosecutions are pending,38 the Court even after Younger
has left the lower federal courts leeway to intervene where they find a specific situation where federal rights are not adequately protected by state
procedures. Thus far, the lower federal courts have not divined exactly
where the Supreme Court meant to strike the present balance in the federal-state compromise in this area,39 probably because the Court itself
wanted to have some experience under the Younger "system" and time for
40
reflection before drawing any firmer lines.
A Single Step
An "introduction" must remain true to its purpose to set the stage for
what follows. This introduction has done little more than describe a few
examples of current general doctrines of federal jurisdiction that might appear to be transgressions of Justice Marshall's famous dictum in Cohens
v. Virginia4 ' and suggest that such doctrines are justifiable in terms of the
constitutional function of the federal courts. It has been suggested that
doctrines such as pendent jurisdiction, federal common law, and abstention
are constitutionally permissible without attempting to define their proper
scopes. 42 The student developments in the symposium which follows will
35. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Although Justice Black in the Court's opinion in Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) seemed to express the opinion that declaratory judgments caused the same interference with state affairs as injunctive relief, his holding
in that case was limited to the situation where a prosecution was pending.
36. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
38. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972).
39. See Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1973); Becker v. Thompson,
459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972); Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972);
Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971); Y.W.C.A. v. Kugler, 342 F.
Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972); Unitarian Church West v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252
(E.D. Wis. 1972); Kennan v. Nichol, 326 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
40. For an analysis of where the present balance in the federal-state compromise
is -after Younger, see Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings:
Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1324 (1972).
For a similar
analysis from the viewpoint of its effect on political dissent see Sedler, Dombrowski in
the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1
(1972).
41. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
42. For instance, there are currently a number of interesting problems concerning
the proper scope of the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. As to pendent
jurisdiction, see Note, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1973).
In the area of ancillary jurisdiction
the Supreme Court has recently reviewed Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d
1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, - U.S. (1973). In that case, the Court of Appeals
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analyze these and related problems of federal jurisdiction in greater depth.
To someone interested in the perception that a new generation of students
bring to old but continuing problems, it will be most welcome.
REMOVAL JURISDICTION

The concept of removal jurisdiction is not expressly recognized in any
part of the Constitution. It is purely statutory in origin, 45 limited to the
transfer of an action from a state court to a federal district court for trial,
and "does not embrace the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction 44 over
state courts."'45 The right of a defendant, in a proper case, to remove the
proceedings from a state to a federal court has existed since the passage
of the first judiciary act in 1789.4" The removal statutes have, however,
47
been strictly construed against the removing party.
The jurisdiction which the federal district court acquires upon removal
may be described as derivative of state jurisdiction 48 and parallel to the
federal court's original jurisdiction. 49 If the state court lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter or parties, the federal district court acquires none
upon removal. 0 Even if the federal court would have assumed jurisdiction
for the Second Circuit held that where named plaintiffs each met the jurisdictional
amount requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) but the unnamed members of
the class did not, the trial court was correct in refusing jurisdiction over the class
proposed and striking all references in the complaint to persons other than the four
named plaintiffs. Judge Timbers dissented, arguing that there should be ancillary
jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed class members and that the majority's view
severely impaired the use of federal class actions. Id. at 1037.
43. Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 24 (1905).
44. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 333 (1816). In Hunter's
Lessee Chief Justice Story refers to the jurisdiction as both appellate and original reasoning that "there is nothing in the nature of the cases which binds to the exercise of
the one in preference to the other." Id. at 333. However, it is important to note that
the general removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) is keyed to original jurisdiction.
45. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.157, at 71 (2d ed. 1965).
46. Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
Section 12 of that act provided the requisites for removal, the nature of the suit, the
amount in controversy and the defendant as the removing party.
47. E.g., City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Shamrock Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); City of Birmingham v. Crosbey, 217 F. Supp.
947, 950 (N.D. Ala. 1963); Rand v. Arkansas, 191 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
An exception to this strict construction is found in that area dealing with federal Officers, see p. 501 infra.
48. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
49. Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871). In that case
the defense counsel questioned the reasoning of Mr. Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The Court agreed with counsel and intimated
that removal was a source of original jurisdiction. Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 287 (1871).
50. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922);
see General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 288 (1922); Courtney
v. Pradt, 196 U.S. 89, 92 (1905).
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had the suit been initiated there, such jurisdiction cannot be invoked in a
removal proceeding.51 Thus, upon removal, the federal court must dismiss
a case brought in a state court if it is one over which the federal court
maintains exclusive jurisdiction. 2 The case cannot be remanded to the
state court and the litigants are burdened with the task of re-instituting the
53
action in the federal court.
There are a number of provisions in the Judicial Code governing removal jurisdiction.5 4 The most important of these are sections 1441, 55 and
57
1442,56 and in more recent years, section 1443.
Section 1441
One must necessarily examine the applicable sections of the Code, and
in so doing will understand the subtleties involved in removal proceedings.
Section 1441 consolidated previous removal provisions5 s and was drafted
to resolve existing statutory ambiguities and conflicts in court decisions.5 9
The statute provides that:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without
regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such
action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one
or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
51. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore &O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).

52. C.

WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS

§ 38, at 131 (2d ed. 1970).

53. Id. at 132.
54. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 (establishing jurisdictional amount), 1441, 1442, 1443,
1444 (foreclosure actions), 1445 (nonremovable actions), 1446 (procedure for removal) and 1447 (procedure after removal) (1970).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1970).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
58. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 28, 53, 36 Stat. 1094, 1101; Act of January 20, 1914, ch. 11, 38 Stat. 278; Act of January 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54,
as amended 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) (Revisor's Notes); Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d
87, 89 (8th Cir. 1947) collecting cases sustaining and denying removal petitions.
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therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.6"
This section is primarily concerned with those cases "of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction. .... 61
Subsection (a) governs the venue of removal actions, expressly providing
that venue lies in "the district court of the United States for the district...
embracing the place where such action is pending." ' 2 Even though this
subsection imposes the requirement of original federal jurisdiction, the state

and federal courts must have concurrent jurisdiction or the case will be dismissed. 63 Subsection (a) also provides that the action "may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants ...
The obvious purpose in
limiting the right of removal to the defendants was to restrict the plaintiff
who had the initial choice of forum. 65 Such a restriction is a viable and
practical means of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.
In diversity situations, subsections (a) and (b) must be jointly construed,
and the case must qualify for removal under both provisions or be remanded to the state court.! 6 Even though diversity exists which would

grant a federal court original jurisdiction as required in subsection (a), subsection (b) is limiting in that the action is removable "only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen 6 7
of the State in which such action is brought."68 The question which logically

emerges is what is the effect upon removal if the plaintiff adds additional
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970). It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss
each removal provision. Attention is directed, however, to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1970), which states that a controversy must be an amount in excess of $10,000 before
it is properly removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
63. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
65. Victorias Milling Co. v. Hugo Neu Corp., 196 F. Supp. 64, 68 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). It is interesting to note that the right was not always restricted to the defendant. During the period from 1875 to 1887 either party was entitled to remove.
Act of March 3, 1895, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 104-105 (1941) (the Court referring to the period of 1875 to 1887).
66. Monroe v. United Carbon Co., 196 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1952); Eriksen v.
Moore Mill & Lumber Co., 157 F. Supp. 888 (D. Ore. 1958); cf. Crispin Co. v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Tex. 1955). In one instance the court relied on
section 1441(a) and did not consider the effect of section 1441(b). Crispin Co. v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
67. Subsection (b) eliminated the confusion which existed in earlier provisions
limiting the right of removal to nonresidents. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231,
§§ 28, 53, 36 Stat. 1094, 1101; Act of January 20, 1914, ch. 11, 38 Stat. 278; Act of
January 31, 1928, ch. 14, § 1, 45 Stat. 54, as amenkded 28 U.S.C. § 71(1940).
In those provisions there was doubt whether nonresidents meant something different
from non-citizens. Section 1441(b) limits removal only where a defendant is a citizen
of the state.
68. 28 U.S.C. §.1441(b) (1970).
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defendants who destroy diversity. The rule disallowing a plaintiff to defeat
jurisdiction through his own ex parte action may properly be applied.69
The concurrent construction of these subsections in diversity suits is the
result of practical considerations. If removal were allowed solely on the
basis of the citizenship requirement established by the "original jurisdiction" language of Section 1441(a), federal removal jurisdiction would be
substantially broadened. Such a construction is clearly contrary to the
trend of court decisions. 70 Furthermore, treating section 1441 (a) as an independent basis for removal renders section 1441 (b) a nullity; 71 the restriction
of a defendant's citizenship established by section (b) is a control placed on
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and it should be construed to effectuate that result.
But where a state civil action is founded on a federal claim or right
falling within the district court's original jurisdiction, 72 citizenship or residence of the parties is immaterial to removal. "This is proper because it is
the federal nature of the claim, and not the character of the parties as in
73
diversity cases, that is the basis of removal."
Subsection (c) apparently enlarges the scope of removal jurisdiction by
permitting "joinder, ' although the congressional intent was to restrict the
removability of cases.74 The purpose of subsection (c) was to decrease
the volume of federal litigation by refusing the removal of a separable controversy, unless such controversy constituted a separate and independent
cause of action. 75 This phrase has been interpreted "as an expression of
congressional intent that there should be a complete absence of underlying
connection between the claims in order to have removal." 76 The leading
case in this area, American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn,77 involved an ac69. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.161 [1], at 530 (2d ed. 1965).
70. In re La Providencia Dev. Corp., 406 F.2d 251, 252 (lst Cir. 1969); see West

Virginia State Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Garrett v.
Btirkers Life

& Cas. Co., 334 F. SUpp. 368, 369 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Helms v. Ehe,

279 F. Supp. 132, 133 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
71. Eriksen v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co., 157 F. Supp. 888, 890 (D. Ore. 1958).
72. In some situations the district court's removal jurisdiction is narrower than its
original jurisdiction. This is Seen in diversity cases which may not be removed if the
defendant is a citizen of the state where the action is brought. C. WIoHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 38, at 133 (1970); Finn v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 207 F.2d 113, 115
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1953).
73. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.160, at 471 (2d ed. 1965).
74. E.g., American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 10 (1951); United
Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 341 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.

Wis. 1972).
75. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fin, 341 U.S. 6, 11 (1951); see Young Spring
& Wire Corp. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 222, 229-30 (W.D.

Mo. 1963).
76. Note, 49 MicH. L. REv. 1236, 1238 (1951); see American Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).

77. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).

This case has been the subject of extensive comment; e.g.,
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tion brought in a Texas state court against two foreign insurance companies
and their mutual agent, who was a citizen of Texas. Plaintiff sought damages for a fire loss on property supposedly insured alleging that liability lay
among the three defendants and pleading alternate theories under which
each would be liable. After removal by the nonresident companies, the
plaintiff obtained a favorable judgment against one of them, but no formal
judgment was entered with respect to the other two defendants. 78 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the defendant successfully con7
tended that the controversy was not a proper subject for removal. 1 In
construing section 1441(c) the Court stated that the addition of the word
"independent" was to give "emphasis to congressional intention to require
more complete disassociation between the federally cognizable proceedings
In remanding the
and those cognizable only in the state courts . . . .",
strict construction
of
position
its
reiterated
case to the state forum, the Court
8
and sought to narrow the interpretation of section 1441(c). I
The Finn decision also raises an important collateral question: where
the defendant has invoked the federal jurisdiction, can he be heard to complain of an adverse judgment on the basis of a procedural error in obtaining
it? The defendant in Finn was allowed to do precisely this.8 2 The dissent
in Finn employed the concept of "jurisdiction by estoppel," 3 a creature
unique to removal. The theory is that once the defendant has invoked the
jurisdiction of the federal court, he should not be heard to complain of
improper removal upon receipt of an adverse judgment.14 The position of
the dissent is more logical than that of the Finn majority which allows a
remand to state court, after which, the plaintiff may sue the defendants
individually in the federal court.8 5 The result of Finn is that the multiplicity of suits, sought to be avoided by section 1441(c), is compounded. 80
Section 1442
Also pertinent is section 1442 which provides for the removal of a state
Note, 50 MIu. L. REV. 475 (1952); Note, 49 Micn. L. REV. 1236 (1951); Note, 100
U. PA. L. RrV. 277 (1951); Note, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 372 (1952).
78. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 181 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 341 U.S. 6
(1950), on remand 207 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).

79. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 11 (1951).
80. Id. at 12.
81. id. at 18.
82. Id. at 16-18. The Court reasoned that the removal would be a wrongful extension of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 16-18.
83. Id. at 21 (Douglas, Black, and Minton, J.J., dissenting); Baggs v. Martin,
179 U.S. 206 (1900). The majority argued that the suit was not one which could
originally have been removed. But "[a]ny requirement of § 1441(c) that was not
met ...
rose no . . . higher than an irregularity, so far as the petitioner is concerned." American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 21 (1951).
84. Note, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 372, 374 (1952).
85. Amerian Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18-19 (1951).
86. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 39 (2d ed. 1970).
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civil or criminal prosecution brought against an officer of the United States
for "any act [done] under color of such office or on account of any right,
title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress .... -87 The focal
point of this section is subsection (a)(1). It was designed "to prevent federal officers or those acting at their direction from being held accountable
in state courts for acts done within the scope of their federal duties." 88
The predecessor of section 144289 was enacted as a result of an attempt
by the State of Tennessee to make the collection of duties under federal tariff
law a criminal offense. 90 In a case adjudicating that statute Justice Strong
emphasized its purpose:
[W]hen [the statute] speaks [of removal] of criminal prosecutions in
State courts, it must intend those that are instituted for alleged violations of State laws, in which defences are set up or claimed under
United States laws or authority. 9 1
In earlier decisions, the courts were inclined to interpret section 1442
93
(a)(1) strictly. 92 The opinion by Chief Justice Taft in Maryland v. Soper
was often used as a test for removal:
In order to justify so exceptional a procedure, the person seeking the
benefit of it should be candid, specific and positive in explaining his
relation to the transaction . . . and 94in showing that his relation to
it was confined to his acts as an officer.
This supports the traditional view of strict construction as well as notes that
removal is an "exceptional procedure." 9 5 The burden was clearly upon the
person who claimed the removal. 9 6
The modern trend, however, is to construe the statute liberally. 97 The
leading case indicating such liberality is Willingham v. Morgan.98 Here, a
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1970). The section protects officers of the United States
or any agency thereof and any officer of the House or Senate. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)
was designed to specifically protect the military.
88. Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., 358 F. Supp.
841, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
89. § 643 REV. STAT. (1874).

90. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).

revenue agent.

In that case the defendant was a

In the course of his employment he was confronted by a group of

citizens engaged in distilling alcohol. In self defense he shot one of the men confronting him. Defendant sought removal on the ground of section 643 of the Revised
Statutes.

91. Id. at 262.
92. E.g., Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926); Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
98 F. 3 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899); Fink v. Gerrish, 149 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

93. 270 U.S. 9 (1926).
94. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 35.

96. Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510, 518 (1932).

clearly indicates that the dictum of Justice Taft was followed.

This is a later case and

97. E.g., Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969); Texas v. National Bank of

Commerce, 290 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832 (1961); Gurda Farms,
Inc. v. Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., 358 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y.

1973).

98. 395 U.S 402 (1969).
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prisoner in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, filed suit in a state
court against the warden and chief medical examiner alleging that they
had innoculated him with "a deleterious foreign substance" and had assaulted, beaten and tortured him in various ways. The defendants sought
to have the cause removed to a federal court. In affirming this right the
Supreme Court noted that the statute is "at the very least . . . broad enough
to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising
out of their duty to enforce federal law." 99 Morgan affirms the notion that
the test for removal should be broader than that for official immunity in
view of the purpose of the statute to protect federal officers from interference by hostile state courts. 10 0 In justification of its holding, the Court
stated that the petitioners could not possibly have been "candid, specific
and positive" because the respondent had filed a "scattergun" petition.' 0 '
The Court intimated that had this been a criminal case the requirements
for removal might be more stringent, 10 2 but unfortunately no elaboration
was provided. The Court apparently reasoned that there is a compelling
"state interest in conducting criminal trials in the state courts."' 0 3 Section
1442(a)(1) is the only part of removal jurisdiction which has been expanded by the courts. It can be theorized that the liberal construction is
the product of a nation of agencies, acting under auspices of federal au10 4
thority and seeking the protection of the federal forum.
Section 1442
Section 1443105 concerns civil rights cases and its primary purpose is to
prevent invidious discrimination under local ordinances, statutes or constitutions. 10 6 The section states that any civil or criminal prosecution may
be removed by the defendant:
(1)
[W]ho is denied or cannot enforce . . . a right under any law
providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law
107
providing for equal rights ....
99. Id. at 406-07.
100. Id. at 405.
101. Id. at 408.
102. Id. at 409 n.4.
103. Id. at 409 n.4.
104. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969); Tennessee v. Davis,
100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879); Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe County Legal Assistance
Corp., 358 F. Supp. 841, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Penney, 320 F. Supp.
1396 (D.D.C. 1970).
105. For an excellent comprehensive and historical analysis of this section, see
Comment, Federal Removal and Ijunction to Protect Political Expression and Racial
Equality: A Proposed Change, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 694, 710 n.81 (1969).

106. Walker v. State, 417 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1969); Poore v. State, 243 F. Supp. 777

(N.D. Ohio 1965), afI'd, 206 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1966).

107. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).

The predecessor of this section was section 641
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Two early Supreme Court decisions formulated the standards to be applied in civil rights cases.108 In Strauder v. West Virginia,10 9 the petitioner,
a Black, sought removal because a West Virginia statute denied Blacks the
right to serve on either the grand or petit juries. The Court allowed the
petitioner to remove because he was being denied a right guaranteed by
the United States Constitution and this denial was manifest in a formal
expression of state law. 110 The second removal decision, Virginia v.
Rives, 1 ' was decided on the same day as Strauder. In this case petitioners,
both Blacks, had been jointly indicted for murder. They sought removal
primarily because of existing prejudice demonstrated by the absence of
Black jurors. They contended that judgment by white peers was a denial
of 14th amendment guarantees. Their petition was refused because it did
not allege a denial of rights manifested in a formal expression of state law.
The court referred the defendants in this case to "the revisory power of the2
higher courts of the State" with ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court."
Strauder and Rives dictate that removal is not warranted simply by an allegation that a denial of rights may occur at the trial, but will be warranted
"only if it can be predicted by reference to a law of general application that
denied or cannot enforce the specified federal rights
the defendant will be
13
in the state courts."'
Accordingly, under section 1443, the defendant must show first, that he
is denied or cannot enforce his rights in a state court and secondly, that these
are civil rights guaranteed to all citizens of the United States. 1 4 Confusion
appears to exist in the first requirement," 5 evidenced by two recent cases." 6
of the Revised Statutes of 1874. Although both subsections to section 1443 concern
federal law protecting equal civil rights, the subsections operate on different principles.
Subsection (1) will be fully developed in this text. In subsection (2) a defendant
need only show that he is "colorably" protected by federal law. Tennessee v. Davis,
100 U.S. 257 (1879). For a scholarly discussion of these provisions see Amsterdam,
Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal
and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793,
851-82 (1965).

108. Strauder v.West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879).
109. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
110. Id. at310-11.
111. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
112. Id.at 319.
113. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1966) (emphasis added). The doctrine laid down in Strauder and Rives was expanded inNeal v.Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880) and Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882). Because of a policy of racial discrimination, both cases were removed. The Court voted, however, that a pretrial removal petition alleging such discrimination stated no ground for removal.
114. Heebe, Removal of State Criminal Prosecutions to Federal Courts-Comments
on City of Greenwood v. Peacock and Georgia v. Rachel, 13 LOYOLA L. REV. 57, 59
(1966-67).
115. Id. at 60.
116. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808 (1966).
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In Georgia v. Rachel,11'7 the petitioner was charged with failure to leave a
place of business upon the owner's request, a misdemeanor under local law.
He thereupon successfully removed the action to the federal district court
on the basis that the local law was discriminatory and a violation of equal
rights." 8 Following the Strauder-Rives doctrine, Rachel dictated that a
denial of rights in the state court must be capable of prediction. 19 This
requirement will not be met unless the defendant can show that he will be
denied rights in each and every state court.120 The "each and every state
court" requirement has been referred to as "unfortunate phraseology,"' 21

and it may be more appropriate to say that the requirement will be met
when it can be firmly predicted that the defendant will be denied his rights

in each state court through which his case would pass.' 22
In another case' 23 the Court denied the right of removal to the petitioners, Blacks involved in a voter registration drive, who were arrested for
minor infractions of a local ordinance-a law which they alleged to be so
vague as to deny them their civil rights. The Court distinguished this case

from Rachel because the right to obstruct a public place was not absolute
and, therefore, not entitled to federal protection. 24 Unfortunately, as in
the earlier cases, the Court scrutinized only the law and not its inequitable
application, and left the defendants to the traditional remedy: vindication
of federal claims on review by the Supreme Court. 125 These decisions do
establish a "firm prediction" requirement as well as enforce the Court's ad-

herence to the Strauder-Rivesdoctrine.

Although primarily applied in cases of racial equality,2-0 removal under
117. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
118. Id. at 785. It is important to note that while the case was pending on appeal
in the court of appeals the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted and the petitioners relied heavily on a specific provision. It was this reliance which led to a successful
removal.
119. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 800 (1966).
120. Id. See Heebe, Removal of State Criminal Prosecutions to Federal CourtsComments on City of Greenwood v. Peacock and Georgia v. Rachel, 13 LOYOLA L.
REV. 57, 60 (1966-67).
121. Heebe, Removal of State Criminal Prosecutions to Federal Courts-Comments
on City of Greenwood v. Peacock and Georgia v. Rachel, 13 LOYOLA L. REv. 57, 60
(1966-67).
122. Id. In Rives the Court stated that "[wihen he has only an apprehension that
such rights will be withheld from him . ..he cannot affirm that they are actually denied . .

.

. Yet such an affirmation is essential to his right to remove his case."

Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 320 (1879); accord, Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780,
799 (1966).
123. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
124. Id. at 826.
125. Section 1443 had not been of great significance until the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
126. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808 (1966); New York v. Galamison,342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1965); City of
Birmingham v. Crosbey, 217 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Ala. 1963). It is imperative that the

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss3/4

16

Walsh: Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not Specifically Conferred

1973]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

section 1443 has been attempted by defendants in other criminal proceedings. 12 7 A leading decision in this area is Rand v. Arkansas 2 where the
defendant was indicted for and convicted of murder in the second degree.
The defendant's petition for removal alleged that she would be denied her
constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury because the case had been
-highly publicized. The federal district court denied removal and remanded
the litigation to the state court reasoning that it could not "determine in

advance of the trial whether a wrong [will occur] so fundamental that it
will make the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and render any
.conviction and sentence wholly void .... ,"129 The mere maladministration of local laws by local officials will not warrant a removal, 13 0 nor will

illegal, corrupt or prejudicial acts of such officials suffice.'

31

The require-

ment of firm prediction does serve "the principle of duality within the federal scheme by severely limiting the occasions upon which federal courts
will interfere in a state criminal proceeding."'13 2 Although the Supreme

involved in
Court has stated that there is a more compelling state interest
34
criminal proceedings, 3 3 identical standards have been applied.'
Judicial interpretation of the statutes concerning removal jurisdiction has

-been highly restrictive except in that area dealing with federal officers. Such
a severe policy may be grounded in several practical considerations. 135
If a defendant is allowed to remove in a doubtful case, he may attack the

validity of the removal action after receiving an adverse judgment. 136

The

courts have construed the statutes strictly against the removing party to
reader realize another limitation imposed by Rachel. This concerns the Supreme
Court's determination that the removal for the protection of civil -rights applies only to
laws of specific civil rights which are stated in terms of racial equality, and not to
,the whole gamut of constitutional rights. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
127. E.g. Tamasino v. California, 451 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 926 (1972) (removal denied where defendant challenged arbitrary imposition of
sentencing); Schneider v. California, 427 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1970) (removal denied
because no federal law required two persons convicted of the same crime .to receive
-identical sentences); West Virginia State Bar v. Bostic, 351 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.W.
Va. 1972) (removal denied because the petition alleged no racial overtones and because there was no indication that federal rights' would not be protected in the
state, court).
128. 191 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1961). Although decided prior to the "racial
equality" criteria set out in Rachel, Rand is still a viable instructional aid to the bar.
129. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
130. Arkansas v. Howard, 218 F. Supp. 626, 630 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
131. Van Newkirk v. District Att'y, 213 F. Supp. 61, 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
132. Comment, Federal Removal and Injunction to Protect Political Expression .and
-RacialEquality: A Proposed Change, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 694, 715 (1969). The author
of this article coined the term "advance certainty -barrier" to replace "firm prediction."
.133. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 n.4 (1969).
134. E.g., City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Orleans Materials &
Equip. Co. v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. La. 1963).
135. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp.
222 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
136. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
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avoid such an occurrence. The better solution would be to estop a defendant from denying the courts' jurisdiction once he has invoked it. 13 7 Another
consideration is that removal jurisdiction is an infringement on state sovereignty. But the advent of the Erie doctrine, 1'38 requiring federal courts to
apply state substantive law in deciding non-federal issues, "has largely eliminated jockeying for a federal . . . forum to obtain an advantage in the

applicable substantive law.""a 9 To refuse removal on the ground that it is
an infringement would nullify its utility.
The least valid reason for strict construction is to relieve the congestion
inthe federal courts, 140 but a federal fact-finding forum is indispensable to
effectively enforce Constitutional guarantees against local action. 14' A litigant endangered by the deprivation of a federal right should be entitled
to the protection of the federal forum. The equity achieved justifies any
resultant congestion. Clarification and simplification of the provisions would
more effectively enable defendants to utilize federal remedies unavailable
at the state level.
Often involved in removal proceedings are the related concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. Both terms identify means of conferring
federal jurisdiction over matters which, if independently pleaded, would be
outside the purview of the federal court.' 42 Although the distinction between these two doctrines is somewhat less than clear, 143 ancillary jurisdiction is often invoked by defendants and intervening third parties, while
pendent jurisdiction may be limited to plaintiffs' joinder of state and federal
144
claims in a single suit.
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

Ancillary jurisdiction is based upon the premise that a court which appropriately has jurisdiction over the subject matter under litigation, may
assume jurisdiction over collateral issues raised by the case, even though
such issues would be denied federal court consideration if independently
137. Id. at 21 (Douglas, Black and Minton, J.J., dissenting); Baggs v. Martin,
179 U.S. 206 (1900).
138. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
139. IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.157[13], at 386 (2d ed. 1965).
140. See generally City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) where Justice Stewart argues !hat a relaxation of the statutes will lead to an onslaught of petitions.
141. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 840 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§ 9, 19 (1970).

143. Id. §§ 9, 19. See Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1970). Compare United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966) (pendent jLrilsdiction), with Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co.,
167 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1948) (,ancillary jurisdiction).
144. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, § 19 (1970).
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initiated. 145 Ancillary controversies are "auxiliary, accessorial or subordinate" to the principal cause of action. 146 Therefore, if a federal court
has assumed jurisdiction over the main subject matter, the ancillary action
need not satisfy the requisites of jurisdictional amount 147 or diversity of citizenship. 148 The reasons for ancillary jurisdiction seem clear: it allows
the court to render a decision that includes all pertinent areas; and further,
it abrogates the need for subsequent litigation on matters subordinate to the
primary federal claim. This dual purpose was reaffirmed by Justice Sutherland in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt 49 where it was stated: That a federal
court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary to an original case or proceeding in the same court, whether at law or in equity, to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered therein,
is well settled."' 150
At its inception, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction developed as a
"functional necessity" born of judicial confusion.' 5 On the one hand, equity
demanded that the courts devise a method of adjudication disposing of all
parties and issues in the suit. 1 52 On the other hand, the law seemed to preclude the exercise of federal court jurisdiction in areas not specifically authorized by the United States Constitution.15 3 As a result, courts were reluctant to reach final judgments, and soon became ridden with a multiplicity
of suits.' 54 In light of this dilemma, a clarification of when jurisdiction
should be exercised over matters ancillary to the main cause was deemed
necessary.' 55
145. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1955). See Dugas v.
American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b),
(g), (h), 14.
146. Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 370, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1956).
147. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1943).
148. Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720 (4th Cir.
1943). The court in describing ancillary jurisdiction stated, "Ancillary jurisdiction exists in order that the court may do complete justice in the chief controversy." Id.
at 723 (emphasis added).
149. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
150. Id. at 239.
151. See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922);
Note, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 326 (1958). '
152. See, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1943); Dillion
v. Berg, 347 F. Supp. 517 (D. Del. 1972); Wilgus v. Peterson, 335 F. Supp. 1385 (D.
Del. 1972).
153. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
154. See, e.g., Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937); Hoffman
v. McClelland, 264 U.S. 552, 558 (1924). See also Note, The Ancillary Concept
& The Federal Rules, 64 HARv. L. REV. 968 (1951); Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REV. 383 (1963).
155. See Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Walmac v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (Ist Cir. 1955).
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In Morrow v. District of Columbia,"" the court acknowledged the importance of extending ancillary jurisdiction to insure that its decision, as
well as those of all federal courts, be given their "full effect." 15 7 In so doing, the court established four broad criteria for determining the circumstances in which the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction was appropriate: first,
if the ancillary matter arose from, or was an integral part of the main matter; second, if the collateral claim could be determined without a substantially new fact finding proceeding; third, if determination of the ancillary
matter would not deprive a defendant of his procedural or substantive rights;
and fourth, if settling the ancillary matter would protect the integrity of the

main proceeding or insure that its disposition would not be frustrated. 15 8
Other federal courts, while using criteria similar to those discussed in Morrow, have limited the application of the doctrine to more narrowly defined

situations-first, one in which the proceeding may affect property already
in the possession or control of a federal court, and second, where the subject
matter is concerned with procedures used by the court to expedite litigation. 159
The exercise of ancillary jurisdiction by federal courts is often found
where claims are made against property involved in a federal controversy.
In order for such a claim to be regarded as ancillary, it must bear a direct
relation to property or assets, actually or constructively drawn into the court's
possession by the principal suit.' 60 In the absence of this relationship, any
attempt to have the property issue considered along with the main cause of
action will be declared void."" Further, the Supreme Court has held that
a claim made upon property must be entertained on independent jurisdic16 2
tional grounds if the court has not yet obtained the requisite control.
156. 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
157. Id. at 740.
158. Id. at 740. See generally Wilgus v. Peterson, 335 F. Supp. 1385, 1388-89
(D. Del. 1972).
159. E.g., Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720, 723
(4th Cir. 1943).
160. See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925); Oils Inc. v.
Blankenship, 145 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 803 (1945);
Barnett v. Mayes, 43 F.2d 521, 527 (10th Cir. 1930).
161. See Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U.S. 552 (1924); Oils Inc. v. Blankenship,
145 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 803 (1945).
162. Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U.S. 552 (1924). The Court, however, explained
that:
It is settled that where in the progress of a suit in a Federal Court property has
been drawn into the court's custody and control, third persons claiming interests in
or liens upon the property may be permitted to come into that court for the
purpose of setting up, protecting and enforcing their claims,-although the court
could not consider or adjudicate their claims if it had not impounded the property
id. at 558. See also Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 581 (1922); Krippendorf v.
Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 281 (1884); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959);
McComb v. McCormack, 159 F.2d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 1947).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss3/4

20

Walsh: Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not Specifically Conferred

1973]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

One of the first cases to illustrate the application of ancillary jurisdiction
over the property or res was Freeman v. Howe. 16 ' Plaintiff, a resident of
New Hampshire, brought an action in federal court to recover a debt against
defendant railroad company, a corporation based in Massachusetts. Pending
judgmenti Freeman, a United States marshal, attached a number of defendant's railroad cars as security for the debt. At the same time, the mortgagees of the railroad company, who were also citizens of Massachusetts,
brought suit in state court to recover the attached property. The state court
judge issued a writ ordering Freeman to surrender the railroad cars and
Freeman appealed. 1 6 4 The United States Supreme Court concluded that a
state court has no jurisdiction over property previously attached by a federal court. 165 It specifically emphasized that other courts are powerless to
adjudicate any claim which may interfere with or invade the possession of
such property. 160 To alleviate any undue hardship which may otherwise
occur, the court lawfully acquiring such property has the authority to ad167
judicate all questions with respect to its title, possession and control.
The most significant aspect of the decision in Freeman was the Court's
response to the mortgagees' argument that denial of state court intervention
Would amount to a denial of their only form of equitable relief.
The principle is, that a bill filed in the equity side of the court to
restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court . . .
is not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent, supplementary
merely to the original suit, out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the parties. 168
Here the parties to the second suit failed to obtain the required diversity of
citizenship necessary to invoke the original jurisdiction of a federal court.
By filing a bill on the equity side of the federal court from which the process of attachment issued, however, the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
would have been justified by the need to provide an adequate and imme163. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
164. Id. at 453.
165. Id. at 457-58.
166. Id. at 457-58.
167. Id. at 457. In Freeman the Court also quoted from Mr. Justice Grier in
Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624-25 (1849),
It is a doctrine of law too long established to require citation of authorities, that,
where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs
in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, till
reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court; and that where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it have once

attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another

court.
See Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562 (1909); Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert
College, 208 U.S. 38 (1908); Oliver v. United States, 156 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1946).
See generally Jacobs v. De Shetler, 465 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1972); Chicago R.I. & P.
Ry. v. City of Owatonna, 120 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1941).
168. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 460 (1860).
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diate forum for a claim against property already within the court's lawful
control. 16 9

In addition to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the res, several
procedural devices require the employment of ancillary jurisdiction to facilitate the complete and equitable disposition of cases by the federal courts.

Although this aspect of ancillary jurisdiction lacks any specific foundation
in prior statutory law, several of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have, for all practical purposes, provided the necessary framework. 170 The

most frequently used devices intended to smooth procedural matters are

those regulating compulsory counterclaims,' 7' cross-claims, 72 joinder of par74
ties 173 and impleaders.1
Rule 13(a) involving compulsory counterclaims 7 r5 requires a party to
plead a counterclaim against a plaintiff if such claim arises from the same
occurrence or transaction. 17 The scope of Rule 13(a) has been defined
by the courts 177 on the basis of an expansion of ancillary jurisdiction as set
out by the decision in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.17 In Moore,
the plaintiff, president of the Odd-Lot Cotton Exchange of New York,
brought suit against defendant alleging certain anti-trust violations. The
defendant filed a compulsory counterclaim seeking injunctive relief.' 79 The
lower court dismissed the federal claim on its merits, and also dismissed
defendant's counterclaim because such action was typically a state remedy.' 80
169. See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 1955); Cooperative
Transit Co. v West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1943).
170. See Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (N.D. Iowa 1959).
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) states that:
A pleading shall take as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if
(1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a
personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim
under this Rule 13.
176. See Local No. 11, Electrical Workers v. G.P. Thompson Elec. Inc., 363 F.2d
181 (9th Cir. 1966).
177. Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (N.D. Iowa 1959). Note, Ancillary
Jurisdiction o1 the Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REv. 383 (1963).
178. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
179. Id. at 603. Plaintiff contends that New York Cotton Exchange was a monopoly
and was using unfair business practices. Defendant in his answer denied plaintiff's
allegations and counterclaimed that plaintiff's activities were impairing the value of
defendant's property and sought to enjoin plaintiffs from decreasing the value of this
property.
180. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 291 F. 681, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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In reversing the lower court's decision as to the claim for injunctive relief,
the Supreme Court stressed that a compulsory counterclaim must be adjudicated on its merits and not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.'"
Rule 13(b) governs permissive counterclaims-those which do not arise

out of the same transaction or occurrence as the principal claim.18 2 Unlike
compulsory counterclaims, permissive counterclaims must be supported by
independent jurisdictonal grounds. 1 8 3 In Industrial Equipment & Marine
Services, Inc. v. M/V Mr. Gus,' 84 a federal district court in Texas formulated a three-fold test to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or permissive: First, are the issues of fact and law arising from both the
main and collateral issues largely the same; second, is the doctrine of res
judicata applicable; and finally, will the same evidence support or refute
the claims of either party.' 8 5 If the tests can be answered affirmatively, the
cause of action is compulsory, rather than permissive, and is therefore ancillary to the original cause of action.
The courts have, however, recognized a limited exception whereby permissive counterclaims may be adjudicated without a finding of jurisdiction
on independent grounds. 186 The exception arises where the permissive
counterclaim is in the nature of a set-off, interposed merely to defeat or reduce the opposing party's claim, for which, however, affirmative relief is
not sought. The application of this exception is evident in Frazier v. Astra
Steamship Corp.,' 8 wherein an injured seaman sought to hold defendant
181. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 607-08 (1926). See Bindcrup v. Path6 Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923), where the Court stated:
Jurisdiction is the power to decide a justiciable controversy, and includes questions
of law as well as of fact. A complaint setting forth a substantial claim under a
federal statute presents a case within the jurisdiction of the court as a federal
court; and this jurisdiction cannot be made to stand or fall upon the way the court
may chance to decide an issue as to the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged any
more than upon the way it may decide as to the legal sufficiency of the facts
proven. Its decision either way upon either question is predicated upon the existence of jurisdiction, not upon the absence of it. Jurisdiction, as distinguished
from merits, is wanting only where the claim set forth in the complaint is so
unsubstantial as to be frivolous or, in other words, is plainly without color of
merit. In that event the claim of federal right under the statute is a mere pretence [sic] and, in effect, is no claim at all.
Id. at 305, 306 (citations omitted).
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b) provides that "a pleading may state as a counterclaim
any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."
183. See Camper & Nicholson's Ltd. v. Yacht "Fountainblew II", 292 F. Supp. 734,
735 (S.D. Fla. 1968). See also O'Connell v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 391 F.2d 156,
163 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated, ordered dismissed as moot, 395 U.S. 210 (1969); Lesnik
v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 975-76 (2d Cir. 1944); Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox,
102 F. Supp. 214, 226 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
184. 333 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
185. Id. at 581, quoting C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1410 (1969).
186. See, e.g., Frazier v. Astra S.S. Corp., 18 F.R.D. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
187. Id.
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shipowner liable under the Jones Act. Defendants counterclaimed for the
liquidated amount of their damages caused by plaintiff in another transaction. In permitting such a set-off, the court recognized that any permissive
counterclaim, not only damage claims, can be adjudicated without estab88
lishing independent jurisdictional grounds.1
Rule 13(g) allows an action to be asserted by one party against his coparty for liability arising from the same transaction.' 8 9 This action may
be permitted against a co-defendant, who is or may be liable to the claimant
for all or part of the claim against him.1 9° In applying Rule 13(g), one
federal court has stated:
[S]ince the adoption of the Federal Rules it has been suggested that
whenever the rules permit the filing of a cross-claim under rule 13(g)
it is by definition "ancillary" to the principal action and thus, under
long established principles, needs no independent jurisdictional grounds
to permit its litigation in federal court.'' I
Finally, Rule 14 dealing with third party practice 19 2 was created to allow a defendant to implead a third party who may be accountable to the
plaintiff in his claim against defendant. 193 Jurisdiction under Rule 14 is
generally considered to be ancillary, but the court may exercise discretion
in determining if such claim may merit adjudication.' 9 4 In commenting on
188. Id. at 242-43.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g); see Elkel v. States Marine Lines Inc., 473 F.2d 959
(5th Cir. 1973); Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1970); W.L. Hiley
& Co. v. County of Niagara, 388 F.2d 746, 749 (2d Cir. 1967); Childress v. Cook,
245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957); Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules,
64 HARV. L. REV. 968, 972-73 (1951).

190. Schwab v. Eire Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1971).
191. Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798, 803 (5th Cir. 1957). For examples of the
"long established principles" mentioned in this case see Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S.
237 (1934); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier,
267 U.S. 276 (1925); Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 79
(N.D. Ala. 1968).
Another procedural rule used by the courts is Rule 13(h). Titled, "Joinder of
Additional Parties," this rule provides for the joinder of "Persons other than those made
parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules,
19 and 20." See Reynolds v. Maples, 214 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1954); Lanier
Business Prods. v. Graymar Co., 342 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 (D. Md. 1972). See also,
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: § 1434, 1435 (1971).
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
193. See generally United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771
(10th Cir. 1968); Noland Co. v. Grarer Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir.
1962); United States v. Edward R. Marden Corp.. 294 F. Supp. 21 (D.R.I. 1968);
United States v. Munroe Towers Inc., 286 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1968). Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules, 64 HARV. L. REV. 968, 973
Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary .Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971).

(1951); Note,

194. See Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1965), where lack of
diversity between the parties was not a bar to applying Rule 14, since the court had
ancillary jurisdiction over the claim. See also Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co.,
167 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1948). For a complete analysis of Rule 14 as it applies to
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, see Note, Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction,
57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971).
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Rule 14, one court has held that "a third party complaint may be maintained
only in cases in which the third-party defendant would be liable secondarily
to the original defendant, in the event the latter is held liable to the plain5

tiff."19

In the application of procedures authorized by both Rules 13 and 14, it
should be borne in mind that the guidelines governing federal power may
"be settled or evaded by the compromises of one generation, only to reappear in the next.' 196 If the present legal generation is to profit from the

actions of those in the past, a first step would be to end "sterile jurisdictional disputes"'197 arising from an arbitrary and rigid interpretation of these
rules. By construing liberally the concept of ancillary jurisdiction,' 9 the
practical needs inherent in our judicial system-the avoidance of multiple
claims, and the prevention of piecemeal litigation-would be satisfied. 99
PENDENT JURISDICTION

Article III of the United States Constitution expressly confers upon federal courts the authority to adjudicate "cases" and "controversies.12 0 0 As
an implied element of this power, federal courts have joined, at their discretion, federal and state claims where necessary to carry out this constitutional mandate. 20 This implied authority, later designated as the "pendent"
jurisdiction of a federal court, was first exercised in 1824. In Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 20 2 the plaintiff bank, chartered under a federal
act, sought to enjoin a state auditor from collecting a tax alleged to be un195. United States v. Munroe Towers Inc., 286 F. Supp. 92, 96 (D.N.J. 1968).
The court also suggests that Rule 14 should not be invoked simply because the third
party may be liable to the plaintiff. Id. at 96. Further, because a claim relates to the
primary cause of action does not necessarily permit the impleading of a third party.
Id. at 96.
196. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Jurisdiction Power between United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
197. Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 809 (2d Cir. 1959).
198. See United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 102 (1970); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir.
1969); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perkins, 388 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1968);
Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957); United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece
Prod., 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955); Walmac v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955);
Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1943); Dillion
v. Berg, 347 F. Supp. 517 (D. Del. 1972); Lanier Business Prod. v. Graymar Co., 342
F. Supp. 1200 (D. Md. 1972); Wilgus v. Peterson, 335 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1972);
Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971).
199. See P.J. Brunswick v. Regent, 463 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1972); Dann v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Edward R.
Maden Corp., 294 F. Supp. 21 (D.R.I. 1968); Frazier v. Astra S.S. Corp., 18 F.R.D.
240 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
200. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
201. See Note, Problems of Parallel State & Federal Remedies, 71 HARV. L. REV.
513 (1958).
202. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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constitutional. Although the facts raised issues relating to both federal and
state law, Chief Justice John Marshall determined that all issues were properly maintained in federal court.
When a question to which the judicial power of the union is extended
by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is
in the power of Congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that
20 3
cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in it.
On the basis of this observation, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was
later extended to include suits wherein the federal question was eventually
dismissed, 20 4 omitted 20 5 or even decided adversely to the party asserting
it.20
In Siler v. Louisville & Northern Railroad,20 7 plaintiff alleged that a
state railroad commission order was unconstitutional and further that a rate
increase which the commission order imposed was unauthorized by state
law. Upon the trial court's rejection of the federal issue, there was a refusal
to even consider plaintiff's second allegation. 20
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the issue concerning the alleged violation of state law
was within the trial court's pendent jurisdiction and should have been litigated upon its individual merits. 20 9 A federal court's refusal to adjudicate
the action would seriously impair the preservation of judicial economy. 210
Pursuant to the decisions in Osborne and Siler, however, it became evident
that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction could have an overly expansive effect upon the authority of a federal court. 211 It also became apparent that
203. Id. at 823. See generally Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of
Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962); Note,
Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Obtained Through Existence of a Federal Question,
40 HARV. L. REv. 298 (1926).
204. See, e.g., Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 240 (1933); Levering & Garrigues
Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933).
205. See, e.g., Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136, 137 (9th Cir. 1969); Salganik v. Mayor
& City Council, 192 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Md. 1961).
206. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Katz Mfg. Co. v.
Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815, 822-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
207. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
208. Id. at 177-78.
209. Id. at 191. In Siler the Court stated,
The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the state statute . . . gave the circuit
court jurisdiction, and having properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide
all the questions in the case, even though it decided the federal questions adversely
to the party raising them, or cven if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided
the case on local or state questions only.
Id. at 191. See Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S 256, 264
(1919).
210. Siler v.Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
211. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S.
478, 482 (1922); Louisville & N'",. R.R. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1916); Louisville &
Nash. kR. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (i913). But see United States Expansion Bolt
Co. v. H.G. Kroncke Hardware Co., 234 F. 868, 872-73 (7th Cir. 1916); Planten v.
Gedney,224 F. 382 (2d Cir. 1915).
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a standard insuring uniform application of pendent jurisdiction was needed
212
to direct any further development.
The Supreme Court, in three major decisions, provided the basis of the
evolution of pendent jurisdiction to its present status. The first of these
cases, Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin,213 was decided in 1933. In a complex fact situation, federal jurisdiction was originally invoked on the grounds
of diversity of the parties' citizenship and of the federal character of plaintiff's
primary claim-that defendant's boycotting activities unlawfully interefered
with interstate commerce and violated federal anti-trust laws. 2 14 In light
of earlier cases which characterized such activities as local, rather than
federal in nature, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff's principal allegations
did not constitute a substantial federal question. The Court reasoned that
when a federal question is obviously without merit or is closely related to
the prior adjudicated state decision the federal court will not grant jurisdiction.
This reasoning established two criteria for measuring the substance of a
21 5
federal claim.
Shortly thereafter, in Hurn v. Oursler,216 the Court further delineated the
standards to be applied in determining whether the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction had been appropriately invoked. Hurn invloved alleged violations
of both the federal copyright laws and certain state laws proscribing unfair
business practices and unlawful competition. Specifically, plaintiffs attempted
to prove that they had written two plays, one of which had been copyrighted
under the laws of the United States and that they had given both scripts to
defendant producers for their consideration. Instead of producing either
work, however, it was alleged that defendants incorporated a major feature
of plaintiff's copyrighted play into one of their own. When plaintiffs discovered the infringement, they brought an action in federal district court
to restrain the play's performance. After trial on the merits, the lower court
found no copyright violation, denied the injunction, and dismissed the
claims related to state law for want of jurisdiction. 217 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the entire judgment,2 I s however, the Supreme
Court, upon submission of the case, questioned whether the issues of unfair
21 9
business practices and unlawful competition had been properly dismissed.
In concluding that dismissal was improper the Court's discussion revealed a
212. See, e.g., Mallinson v. Ryan, 242 F. 951, 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Onondaga
Indian Wigwam Co. v. Ka-Noo-No Indian Mfg. Co., 182 F.832 (N.D.N.Y. 1910).
213. 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
214. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1932).
215. 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1932).
216. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
217. Id. at 239-40.
218. Hum v. Oursler, 61 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1932) (per curiam).
219. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 240 (1933).
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two-step standard to be applied in seeking the appropriate exercise of
pendent jurisdiction.
The first step reiterated the declaration of Levering: to determine whether
the case as a whole presents a "substantial federal question. '220 Because
the lower court had thoroughly reviewed this issue and found the allegations
of state law violations to be inseparable from the federal question, on appeal,
this determination was accepted without dispute. 221 Although the language

in Levering was not repeated in Hurn, it was apparent from the Court's discussion that the problem was considered but in this instance, deemed to be
222
resolved.
Once the facts of a case have satisfied the preliminary requirement of
substantiality, the second step is to determine whether the relationship
between the federal and state issues alleged is sufficient to support a single
cause of action. The Court established this step or the "cause of action test"
by contrasting permissible and nonpermissible exercises of federal court
jurisdiction over state claims.
The distinction to be observed is between a case where two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of
which presents a federal question, and a case where two separate
and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is federal
in character. In the former, where the federal question averred is not
plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal ground be not established, may nevertheless retain and dispose
of the case upon the nonfederal ground;
in the latter it may not do so
23
upon the nonfederal cause-of-action.2

220. Id. at 243-44. It was determined in Hurn that a substantial federal question is
essential to a federal jurisdiction in the absence of diversity. See, e.g., Cuyahoga River
Power Co. v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 252 U.S. 388 (1920); Katz Mfg.
Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 211 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
221. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 242 (1933).
222. Id. at 246-47.
223. Id. at 246 (Court's emphasis).
Another test applied by the courts in determining whether a "substantial federal question" exists is the "introduction of evidence
test." See Robinson v. Stanley Home Prod. Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1959); Massachusetts Universalists Convention v. Hildrath & Rodgers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir.
1950). See also Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1025 (1962); Note, 59 YALE
L.J. 978 (1950).
The basic premise underlying this test is that a federal court should use its discretion
in the adjudication of related state claims. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt,
103 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1939). This court expressed the view that "under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court the existence of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a class of cases does not impose upon a court an absolutle duty to exercise its
jurisdiction whenever invoked .... ." Id. at 617 (emphasis added). The indication of
court discretion was further discussed" in Walters v. Shari Music Publishing Corp.,
193 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1961 ), wherein the court stated, "For the dog would be
wagged by his tail if plenary trial of an ancillary claim was compelled by a primary
claim which [was] disposed of [prior to trial]." Id. at 308, quoting H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS & THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 808 (1953).
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Further, if the state claim is found to constitute a separate but parallel
ground for relief which nevertheless is inextricably linked to the federal claim,
a single cause of action exists even though the facts upon which each
ground is based are dissimilar. 224 "The facts are merely the means and
not the end. They do not constitute the cause of action, but they show its
'225
existence by making the wrong appear.
The complex and ill-defined requirements established in Levering and
Hurn created problems of interpretation which plagued the lower federal
courts for many years. 226 In 1966, however, the Supreme Court remedied
the confusing situation by discarding the "cause of action" standard. In
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,22 1 the plaintiff, Gibbs, was employed by
Grundy Coal Company to organize the opening of a new mine. When a
labor dispute arose among members of the United Mine Workers union,
Gibbs hired members of a rival union to complete the contract. The
United Mine Workers boycotted his work site, and forcibly prevented him
from fulfilling his contractual obligation. Gibbs lost his job and soon
after, began losing other contracts with companies in the area. On the
basis of the secondary boycott, he brought suit in federal court against
228
Addithe United Mine Workers for violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
tionally, he sought damages for United Mine Workers' alleged interference
with his contract of employment. 229 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower federal court that it had jurisdiction
over both actions, even though plaintiff's second allegation was typically
224. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). In Hurn the Court noted: "[T]he
claims of infringement and unfair competition so precisely rest upon identical facts as
to be little more than equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of
circumstances." Id. at 246.
225. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1932), quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927). See Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, 189 F.2d
546 (2d Cir. 1951) where the court stated:
Dependent jurisdiction existed to decide a single cause of action upon a nonfederal ground recovery on the federal ground having failed, but that jurisdiction did
not exist to adjudicate a non-federal claim merely because it was joined with a
federal one unless there was substantial identity in the facts to be proved to
support each of the two.
Id. at 548. But see Manosky v. Bethlehem-Hingham Shipyard Inc., 177 F.2d 529 (1st
Cir. 1949). Here, it would seem that there was not a substantial federal question for
litigation. Id. at 531-32. See also Foster D. Snell Inc. v. Potters, 88 F.2d 611 (2d
Cir. 1937); J.MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.06(5), at 369 (2d ed. 1970).
226. See Robinson v. Stanley Home Prods. Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1959);
Massachusetts Universalists Convention v. Hildrath & Rodgers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st
Cir. 1950); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1939);
Walters v. Shari Music Publishing Corp., 193 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Salganik
v. Mayor & City Council, 192 F. Supp. 897 (D. Md. 1961).
227. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
229. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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pursued at the state level. 23 0 The Supreme Court agreed, predicating its
holding on two considerations: that both actions must arise from "a
common nucleus of operative facts" and also that both actions are such as
2 31
would normally be tried in one proceeding.
The Court, aware that this decision replaced the "cause of action" test

established in Hum, justified the holding by distinguishing Hurn as being
decided "before the unification of law and equity by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure" 232 and criticizing the use of the term "cause of action" because it lacked definition and was the subject of constant dispute. 23 a The
"impulse" should now be "toward entertaining the broadest possible scope

of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties
and remedies .... ,,234 This language from Gibbs has commonly been

used when referring to ancillary jurisdiction, not pendent jurisdiction. 235
Have the paths of the two separate doctrines, ancillary and pendent, met?

The ramifications of the Gibbs decision have generated much discussion
among the legal community.13
Authorities in commenting on this new
thrust of pendent jurisdiction contend that federal courts may now lawfully
intrude upon areas which perhaps should remain within the jurisdiction of

a state court. 237 Supporters, however, suggest that Gibbs' reliance on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in fact expanded the doctrine of pendent
238
jurisdiction, but to its desired extent.

230. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 343 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1965).
231. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722 (1966).
232. Id. at 722.
233.

Id. at 722.

234. Id. at 724. In Gibbs the Court stated:
If considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in
federal courts to hear the whole.
Id. at 725 (court's emphasis). See Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 828-29 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Elberti V. Kunsman, 254 F. Supp. 870, 871
(E.D. Pa. 1966); United States v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 254 F. Supp. 637, 639-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1972);
Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136, 137 (9th Cir. 1969), where the court stated, "Joinder of
claims, not joinder of. parties, is the object of the doctrine." Other cases have extended
jurisdiction where there is a "common nucleus of operative facts." Wilson v. American
Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp.
323, 335 (E.D Pa. 1966); Lewis v. Penington, 257 F. Supp. 815, 864 (E.D. Tenn.
1966).

See generally Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity Cases, 30 U. Ptrr.

L. REv. 607 (1969).
235. See cases cited note 234 supra.
236. See The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 223 (1966). The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have helped to codify the evasive term, "a single
cause of action." See Note, 44 TEXAs L. Rrv. 1631, 1635 (1966).
237. See Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of Pendenting Parties, 30 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 1 (1972); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968); Note, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The
Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction-ConferringClaim, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1973).

238. In analyzing the Hum and Gibbs decisions, both cases adjudicated matters in
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FEDERAL COURT ACTIONS TO RESTRAIN STATE OFFICERS

The 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a suit
against a state by a citizen of another state or foreign country without the

defendant state's consent.2 3 9 This restriction has also been construed as

240
barring suit by citizens against their own state.

In 1887, the United States Supreme Court provided a method to circumvent, under certain conditions, the effect of the llth amendment. In re
Ayers 241 involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by certain state of-

ficials who had been jailed for contempt when they violated an injunction
granted by a federal court. The petitioners contended that since the suit
was against state officials to enjoin performance of their official duties, it
was an action against the state and therefore prohibited by the 11 th amend-

ment. The court agreed, but went on to say that:
An unconstitutional law will be treated by the courts as null and void.

If, therefore, an individual, acting under the assumed authority of a state, as one of its officers, and under color of its laws, comes into
conflict with the superior authority of a valid law of the United States,
which federal and state claims were made against the same defendant. Most courts
interpreted this as a restriction of pendent jurisdiction, and have denied jurisdiction
where it involves a claim against a co-defendant, or joinder of parties to the pendent
claim. The following cases have denied pendent jurisdiction in those cases involving
third parties: Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1212, 1221 (9th Cir. 1972); Wojtas v.
Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797, 799-800 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964
(1965); New Orleans Pub. Belt R.R. v. Wallace, 173 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 1949);
Pearce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 162 F.2d 524, 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 765
(1947); Jennings v. Davis, 339 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Barrows v. Faulkner,
327 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Okla. 1971).
In 1971 Judge Friendly of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote three
opinions based on the standards of pendent jurisdiction as stated in Gibbs. These
cases are Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 944 (1972); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d
Cir. 1971); Astor-Honor Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629-30 (2d
Cir. 1971). For an analysis of these cases see Note, Federal Pendent Subject Matter
Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not
Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1973).. These
decisions allowed an extension of pendent jurisdiction to those cases in which additional
parties have entered the litigation. Id. at 160-63.
In these cases Judge Friendly determined that as long as the same nucleus of operative facts governs the claim, the court should adjudicate the entire matter. Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944
(1972); Leather's Best Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1971);
Astor-Honor Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1971).
In extending the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, Judge Friendly has given notice to
other federal jurisdictions that a pendent claim should be adjudicated so long as the
case is based on identical claims.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
240. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
241. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
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he is stripped of his representative character, and subjected in his
242
person to the consequences of his individual conduct.
This reasoning provided direct support for the subsequent decision in the
landmark case of Ex parte Young 243 although the Court in Young recognized it as a fiction.2 44 The Young case dealt with a Minnesota legislative
enactment that greatly reduced railroad rates, and provided harsh penalties
for violators. Before the provisions went into effect, stockholders of the railroad successfully filed suit in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the Act,
alleging that its rates and penalties were so unreasonable that they amounted
to a deprivation of property without due process. The Minnesota Attorney
General, in violation of the injunction, initiated proceedings in state court
to compel compliance with the new rates. The Attorney General was taken
into custody for contempt and in his petition for habeas corpus contended
that the temporary injunction was illegal by virtue of the llth amendment.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found the Minnesota statute
to be unconstitutional on its face. 24 5 The Court was then confronted with
a dilemma. On the one hand, the petitioner objected to the jurisdiction of
the federal court on the basis that such action amounted to a suit against
a state, without its consent; a prohibition of the l1th amendment. On the
other hand, the stockholders of the railroad alleged deprivation of property
without due process of law, an act forbidden by the 14th amendment. The
Court could have resolved this conflict by construing the 14th amendment
as a limitation on the prohibition contained in the 11 th amendment.2 4 6 The
Court instead resorted to the fiction supplied by Ayers for the basis of its
opinion:
[T]he use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act
. . . is a proceeding without the authority of . . . the State in its
sovereign . . . capacity . . . . [T]he officer . . . is in that case
stripped of his . . .representative character and is subjected . . . to
2 47
the consequences of his individual conduct.
The reasoning in Young has subsequently been applied in many other
areas of litigation. Examples may be found in desegregation cases which
seek to force state and county officials to provide integrated educational
facilities; 248 in welfare cases which seek to compel equal distribution of
242. Id. at 506-07.
243. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
244. Id. at .173-74.
245. Id. at 147. In explaining this decision the Court reasoned that where the
penalties for disobedience were so enormous and severe as to intimidate the company
and officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the acts

were unconstitutional on their face.

246. See note 13 supra.
247. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 1.59-60 (1908).
248. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss3/4

32

Walsh: Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not Specifically Conferred

1973]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

welfare funds; 249 in the administration of federal-state aid programs for the
aged, blind, and disabled which seek to coerce timely processing of applications for benefits; 25 ° and, in criminal cases, against judges and prosecuting attorneys to prevent racial discrimination in the application of penal
statutes.2 51 It is apparent that the decision in Young, though based on a
fiction, nevertheless is an extremely important tool that may be employed
to secure constitutionally guaranteed rights.
While the removal statutes, the related doctrines of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction, the unsettled theory of protective jurisdiction, and the federal
cases restraining state officers all tend to enlarge federal jurisdiction by
varying degrees, an opposite intent is inherent in the Anti-Injunction Statute and the operation of the abstention doctrine.
FEDERAL COURT ACTIONS TO RESTRAIN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

Congress, in 1793, drafted and enacted into law the Anti-Injunction Statute. It provided: "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted [by any
court of the United States] to stay proceedings in any court of a state
... ,252 The purpose of this statute was to prevent unnecessary friction
between state and federal courts. 25 3 The existence of certain requirements
and conditions, however, gives rise to exceptions wherein a federal court
will entertain a suit in equity to enjoin a state court proceeding.
In general, the basis for equitable intervention is lack of an adequate
remedy at law. 25 4 The Anti-Injunction Statute, however, limits federal
equitable jurisdiction in that it expressly prohibits federal injunctions against
state court proceedings even though plaintiff's remedy at law be inadequate. 255 Therefore, before an injunction will issue, in addition to satisfying
general equitable principles, the facts of the case must also bring it within
256
one of the exceptions to the statute.
The first exception to be generally recognized by the courts was established in 1874, in French v. Hay.257 In an earlier hearing of French v.
Hay on the issue of removal, the Court held that the cause had been prop249. Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 241 (2d Cir. 1972).
250. Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1973) (where the court provided
for retroactive benefits if there was unreasonable delay).
251. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
252. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334.
253. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1940).
254. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co.,

287 U.S. 92 (1932); Grand Chute v. Winegar, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 373 (1872).

See

generally J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 132, 173, 176, 180, 216-22, 295 (5th
ed. 1941).
255. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
286 (1970).

256. Id.at 287.
257. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874).
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erly removed to federal court. 258 In this subsequent case, which was ancillary to the removal issue, the Court affirmed a decree granting an injunction to stay state court proceedings thereby allowing the federal court
259
to protect the jurisdiction it had acquired by virtue of the removal act.
A second early exception permitted federal courts to enjoin state proceedings upon issues which had been fully litigated in federal court.26 0 This exception is illustrated in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.2 6 1 Suit had
been filed here against a fraternal society, organized under the corporate
laws of Indiana, on certain certificates that the corporation had issued.
Jurisdiction was vested in the federal district court in Indiana since the
plaintiffs, certificate holders, were not Indiana citizens. The in-state certificate holders were not joined as party plaintiffs in this action. A decree
was rendered for the defendant in the initial suit; however, a subsequent
action was brought in the state court against the fraternal organization by
the in-state certificate holders on the issues previously litigated. The plaintiffs in this second action contended that because they had not joined in
2 62
the prior suit, the decision was not res judicata as to their complaint.
The defendant organization sought an injunction in federal court to stay
the second suit. The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction and an appeal was taken. 26 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the appellants were members of the class whose
rights had been fully adjudicated, the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin
26 4
the state proceedingsin order to prevent the issues from being relitigated.
Another type of case which falls within the ambit of the "relitigation"
exception is one which is ancillary to another proceeding already within the
jurisdiction of the federal court. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,265 a federal
district court had adjudicated Hunt to be bankrupt. Included in the schedule of liabilities presented to the court was a debt owed to the Local Loan
258. French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 238, 249-50 (1874).
259. French v. Hay, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250, 252-53 (1874), where the Court held
that the jurisdiction obtained by the federal court by virtue of the removal act in effect
at the time (Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 167, 14 Stat. 558) was entitled to injunctive,

protection.
260. Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401, 411-12 (1893), wherein'it is stated: "The
jurisdiction of courts of equity to interfere and effectuate their own decrees by injunctions . . . in order to avoid the relitigation of questions once settled between the same
parties, is well settled."

It should be noted, however, that in this case the court was

speaking of equity courts in general, and made no reference to the Anti-Injunction

Statute.
261. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
262. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 264 F. 247, 248 (D. Ind. 1920).
263. Id. at 249, where the court stated: [The in-state certificate holders] not being
parties to the original bill, this proceeding . . . is an original bill of an Indiana corporation against Indiana citizens, and this court is without jurisdiction.
264. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
265. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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Company. Subsequently, the loan company sued Hunt in state court to
enforce an assignment of his wages which had been made to secure the
debt. This latter proceeding was enjoined to preserve the judgment ren266
dered when the federal court adjudged Hunt to be bankrupt.
It is therefore apparent that before an injunction may issue to prevent
relitigation, the parties and issues must be the same in both suits. It is
also clear that the court must look to the substance of the pleadings rather
than to their form in order to determine if in fact the parties 26 7 and issues 268
were the same in both suits.
Another exception allowing injunctions against state court proceedings
occurs in an in rem action where a federal court has previously acquired
26 9
jurisdiction of the res. The Court in Kline v. Burke Construction Co.
explained this exception and its necessity:
Where the action is in rem the effect is to draw to the federal court
the possession or control, actual or potential, of the res, and the exercise by the state court of jurisdiction over the same res necessarily
impairs, 270
and may defeat, the jurisdiction of the federal court already
attached.
It should be noted that the authority to enjoin in rem proceedings lies with
the court that first acquired jurisdiction, 27" and that the power of the state
courts in this respect is co-equal with that of the federal courts. 272 By way
of contrast, in personam proceedings may be pursued simultaneously in both
273
state and federal courts.
In, addition to these judicially-created exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Statute, which seem only to help to effect the federal courts' control as provided by removal and pendent jurisdiction, there developed statutory exceptions as well which may be viewed as implied legislative amendments to the
Anti-Injunction Statute. 27 4 The Interpleader Act 275 was one of the few
266. Id. at 244-45.
267. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
268. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
269. 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
.270. Id. at 229. Accord, Holmes v. Dowie, 177 F. 182, 183 (7th Cir. 1910);
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. Elevated R.R., 177 U.S. 51, 61 (1900).
271. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922), where the Court stated:
The rule, therefore, that the court first acquiring jurisdiction shall proceed without

interference from a court of the other jurisdiction is a rule of right and of law

based upon necessity, and where the necessity, actual or potential, does not exist,
the rule does not apply.
272. Id. at 229-30.
273. Id. at 230. Accord, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive

Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970); Hunt v. New York Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322, 339
(1907); Ungar v. Mandell, 471 F.2d 1163 (2d Cir. 1972). Contra, Looney v. Eastern
Texas R.R., 247 U.S. 214, 221 (1918).

274. Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARv. L. REv. 726,
730 (1961).
275. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970).
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statutes which expressly provided that a federal district court could enjoin
state court proceedings. Most statutes which gave rise to exceptions to the
Anti-Injunction Statute conferred on the federal courts original and/or
exclusive jurisdiction of an action arising under their authority.27U Thus, Congress intended that the Anti-Injunction Statute should not apply in these
instances. 277 In the area of bankruptcy, for example, it is provided by
statute that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of all matters and proceedings in bankruptcy." 27 8
In 1941, the Supreme Court, in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 27 9 significantly restricted the power of federal courts to issue injunctions against state proceedings. 28 0 Toucey brought an action against the
defendant insurance company in federal court, alleging fraudulent cancellation of a policy. Judgment was rendered in favor of the insurance company, and 2 years later, Toucey's assignee brought suit on the same cause
of action in a state court. The insurance company sought injunctive relief
in federal court, contending the issue was res judicata. The petition for
an injunction was denied. While the Court did recognize five statutory
exceptions, 28' it held the in rem exception 28 2 to be the only valid judiciallycreated exception. 281 Consequently, it was held that a federal court had no
power to stay a state court proceeding simply because the matter in controversy had previously been adjudicated in federal court.2 84 This decision
had the effect of completely emasculating the "relitigation" exception.
Seven years after the Toucey decision, the first significant revision of the
Anti-Injunction Statute was effected. 28
It prohibited federal injunctions of
276. E.g., Bankruptcy Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970).
277. Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REv.
726, 731 (1961).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970).
279. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
280. Id. at 137-39. The Court did not recognize the validity of the "relitigation"
exception.
281. The five statutory exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Statute were set down by
Mr.Justice Frankfurter in Toucey as: (1) Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1970);
(2) Frazier-Lemke Act, 11 U.S.C. § 203 (1970); (3) Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1335 (1970); (4) Removal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970); (5) Limitation of Shipowner's Liability, 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118,
132-34 (1941).
282. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922). In stating the in rem
exception the Court said: "It is settled that where a federal court has first acquired
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of a cause, it may enjoin the parties from proceeding in
a state court of concurrent jurisdiction where the effect of the action would be to
defeat or impair the jurisdiction of the federal court."
283. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139 (1941). In discussing
the "relitigation" cases, the Court said: "Loose language and a sporadic, ill-considered decision cannot be held to have imbedded 'inour law a doctrine which so patently
violates the expressed prohibition of Congress." Id. at 139.
284. Id. at 139.
285. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), formerly Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265,
36 Stat. 1162 (1911).
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state proceedings, with three exceptions: first, as expressly authorized by
act of Congress; second, where necessary in aid of federal jurisdiction; and
third, to protect or effectuate federal judgments. 286 These broad exceptions
were designed to reinstate the judicial exceptions recognized prior to the
Toucey decision. 287 Therefore, if an injunction is to issue today, it-must
2 88
be granted on the basis of one of these statutory exceptions.
In examining this revision of the Anti-Injunction Statute, an initial concern is what has been determined to be an expressly authorized exception.
[I]n order to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception to the antiinjunction statute, an Act of Congress must have created a specific
and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court
court were not emof equity, that could be frustrated if the2 8federal
9
powered to enjoin a state court proceeding.
An act, in order to be recognized as an "expressly authorized" exception,
need not refer to the Anti-Injunction Statute;290 indeed, only a few such
2 91
measures explicitly authorize an injunction to issue under their authority. .
Other statutes which have been held to be "expressly authorized" usually
provide a suit in equity as a means of redress, 29 2 or that all other proceed293
ings should cease upon compliance with the requirements of the statute.
The second exception provided by the, revised act, "in aid of its jurisdiction," allows a federal court to protect jurisdiction it has properly ac294
quired. Cases removed to federal court come within this exception.
Once removed, a case is no longer subject to litigation in the state courts,
and any proceeding thereon may be enjoined. 295 In rem proceedings also
fall under this exception.29 6 The necessity for the297in rem exception was
even recognized by the restrictive decision in Toucey.
The third exception, "to protect or effectuate its judgments," was designed
286. Id.

287. Id. (Revisor's Note).

288. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,

287 (1970).
289. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237 (1972).

290. Id. at 237.

291. E.g., Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1970); Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2251 (1970); Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970).
292. E.g., Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was held to be an expressly
authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute by the Court in Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
293. E.g., Limitation of Shipowner's Liability, 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) was held to be
an expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute in Beal v. Waltz, 309
-F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1962).

294. Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)

(Reviser's Note); accord,

Brown v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 309 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
295. See Brown v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 309 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
296. Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings,74 HARv. L. REv. 726,

735 (1961).

297. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 139 (1941).
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to allow a federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding on issues which
had been previously litigated in the federal forum. 298 Such injunctive relief
saves "the defendants in tht
state proceedings the inconvenience of pleading
'29 9
and proving res judicata.'
In order for an injunction to issue in aid of the court's jurisdiction or
to effectuate its judgments, something more is required than the mere relation of the requested injunction to the court's jurisdiction or judgment.30 0
Both of these latter exceptions set out in the revision require such interference "with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to
seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that
case." 10' However, this is not true where the United States Government
itself seeks injunctive relief. The rationale for this rule lies in the very
purpose of the act itself-the prevention of conflict between federal and
state courts.3 02 This policy has been stated to be "much more compelling
when it is the litigation of private parties which threatens to draw the two
judicial systems into conflict . . . than when it is the United States which

seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest."' 303 The potential harm from frustration of national interests would
far outweigh any benefits derived from including the United States within
30 4
the coverage of the statute.
THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

Abstention, a doctrine virtually unknown at early common law, has often
been invoked over the last 50 years by many federal courts in refusing to'
accept jurisdiction.3 0 5 The essence of the abstention doctrine80" is a realization by the federal judiciary that there are particular circumstances in
which a federal court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, even
though it clearly has potential jurisdiction over the matter in controversy. 30 7
298. Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (Reviser's Note).
299.

Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129 (1941).

300. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281,
295 (1970).
301.

Id. at 295.

302. See Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225 (1957).
303. Id. at 225-26.
304. Id. at 226.
305. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), has had a profound
impact on the application of abstention. The landmark decisions of Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), together with
Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), reflect the difficulties of

fashioning a test for proper abstention.

See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

306. "Abstention doctrines" is a more proper phrase to refer to the phenomenon
of abstention, in the authoritative opinion of Professor Wright, because it more pre-

cisely implies that there are various circumstances under which a court will choose to
abstain. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 196 (2d ed. 1970).
307.

Caveat: Reference to the abstention doctrine in this article is to the situa-

tions where the court does abstain from accepting jurisdiction. This act of abstaining
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The early foundation for the doctrine was fashioned from a conglomeration of sources: the principle that equity demands exhaustion of available
state remedies;3° 8 the admonitions of the 11th amendment, limiting the judicial power of the federal courts under specified circumstances;3 0 9 the principle of comity, under which the federal courts, out of deference and respect,
grant effect to the judicial processes of the states;3 10 and the policy of noninterference with a sovereign state's affairs, which is part of the grand
scheme occasionally referred to as "Our Federalism. '3 11 The concern over
preserving the sovereign nature of the several states was reflected in an
13
Act of 1793,312 the precursor of our present Anti-Injunction Statute,
which generally prohibits the issuance of federal injunctions to stay state
proceedings.
Although most of the decisions in the 19th century applied the above policies when refusing to invoke federal jurisdiction, 31 4 an early case in this
century forced an exception to the considerations surrounding comity and
the demands of the 11th amendment. In Ex parte Young 3 15 the Supreme
Court granted plaintiffs an injunction against a state officer to prevent his
enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute.316 The fact that proceedmust be distinguished from "abstention" in the broadest sense, sometimes used in opinions to indicate application by the court of the "abstention doctrine" in determining
whether to accept, or to abstain from accepting, jurisdiction over the case.
308. See, e.g., Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894, 899 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
309. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI states: The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.
310. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 964 (8th Cir. 1971) (dissenting
opinion), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
311. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), Mr. Justice Black remarked:
What ["Our Federalism"] does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which
the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
312. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335 which read in part: "[Nior
shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state .... "
313. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Note the distinction between cases involving pending state proceedings in which the Anti-Injunction Act generally forbids federal injunctive relief, and between those other cases dealing with threatened state proceedings not
yet begun, to which the principle of comity applies its force.
This "threatened-pending" dichotomy is one which rears its persistent head in matters
of abstention as well. The Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1917), recognizing the dichotomy, chose to ignore the "threatened proceedings" situation since it
was not at issue in that case. The distinction is obviously one of considerable significance in the abstention area.
314. See, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899) (refusal to voluntarily grant
equitable relief in interference with pending or threatened state proceedings); In re
Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888) (refusal to interfere with state's enforcement of an unconstitutional criminal statute).
315. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
316. In so) doing, the Court conjured up a fiction which has been severely criticized.
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ings were threatened and not pending was cited in the opinion as being of
great importance, since comity and federalism consideratons would appar3 17
ently dictate a different result in a pending proceedings situation..
Young established the unique precedent that a federal court may, under
"special circumstances," enjoin threatened state proceedings, despite the persuasion of comity. This novelty caused a great furor concerning the powers
of federal court judges, and Congress introduced a tempering measure in
the form of the Three Judge Court Act.31
Another decision, decided the
same year, tended to limit the scope of Young and made it clear that the
equity principle of exhaustion of state remedies was still a viable proposition.31 9 It was through the post-Young reaffirmance of the policy in favor
of avoiding interference with state proceedings that the concept of "absten3 20
tion" crept into our jurisprudence.
The term "abstention" first distinctly appeared in the 1941 landmark
opinion of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 3 2 1 A group of black
porters employed by Pullman Company joined a railroad company in attacking a regulation of the Texas Railroad Commission which required that all
Pullman cars be continuously in the charge of an employee having the rank
and position of a Pullman conductor. Since it was well known that all such
See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 48, at 184-85 (2d ed. 1970). The opinion sidestepped the effect of the 1lth amendment by reasoning that a suit against a state officer
is only a suit against the state if that officer was acting in an official capacity and
within his official duties; that the state official in this case was trying to enforce an
unconstitutional statute; that such attempted enforcement is out of the scope of his
official duties; and that herefore the suit was against him personally.
Another basis for the decision was the finding by the Court that property rights
were being endangered, in that the state statute at issue contained penalties which
included monetary fines.
On the matter of property rights as a basis for federal action, see Note, Implications
of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When no State
Prosecution is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 876-77 (1972).
317. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
318. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides:
An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be
granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
319. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
Prentis, together
with Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914), established the general rule that a
litigant must "normally" exhaust a state's "legislative" or "administrative" remedies before bringing an action to review the matter in federal court, though he need not
"normally" exhaust a state's "judicial" remedies before seeking federal review. See
generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 49, at 187-88 (2d ed. 1970).
320. Indeed, Professor Wright designates the whole concept of abstention as one of
four areas constituting restrictions on Ex parte Young. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 48, at 186 n.23 (2d ed. 1970).
321. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss3/4

40

Walsh: Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not Specifically Conferred

1973]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

conductors were white persons, the black porters alleged that the state regulation was discriminatory in violation of their 14th amendment rights.
The Supreme Court of Texas had not dealt with the constitutionality of the
regulation and, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court elected to abstain. The decision, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, made it clear that
federal courts should avoid resolving constitutional questions if there are
accompanying questions of state law which might be dispositive of the
case. 322 The "Pullman doctrine" was the first to focus clearly on a definitive situation in which the federal court should abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction, and it has been followed unerringly in proper cases. 323 It is
not always evident, however, when resolution of the state issues will be appropriate to the disposition of the case. Abstention is not applicable, for
example, where the state issues are well-settled,3 24 or where the state stat3 25
ute in question is patently unconstitutional.
In the years following Pullman, most of the decisions involving abstention
were based on the considerations of comity and state sovereignty which are
32 6
inherent in "Our Federalism.
The basis of the doctrine seems to be the special problems which
322. 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941), citing Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n,
296 U.S. 64 (1935); Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Pennsylvania
v.Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); Hawkes v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933); Gilchrist
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S.
240 (1926); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919). The distinguished Justice
thereupon commented:
These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system
whereby the federal courts, "exercising a wise discretion," restrain their authority
because of "scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state government" and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary. . . . This use of
equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional
restriction of those powers.
Regard for these important considerations of policy in the administration of federal equity jurisdiction is decisive here. If there was no warrant in state law for
the Commission's assumption of authority there is an end of the litigation; the
constitutional issue does not arise. The law of Texas appears to furnish easy and
ample means for determining the Commission's authority. . . . In the absence
of any showing that these obvious methods for securing a definitive ruling in the
state courts cannot be pursued with full protection of the constitutional claim, the
district court should exercise its wise discretion by staying its hands.
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
323. See Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); A.F. of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582
(1946); Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); City of Chicago
v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942); cf. Elder v. Rampton, 360 F. Supp.
559 (D. Utah 1972), aff'd, -

U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 3062, 37 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (1973).

324. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958); City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
325. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528 (1965); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
326. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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beset a federal union. In some cases where jurisdiction is granted it
should not be exercised in order to avoid unnecessary conflict with
important state functions or a needless 32prediction
as to matters on
7

which the states speak with final authority.
Accordingly, the doctrine has been specifically applied t6 insure non-inter-

ference by the federal courts with a state's administrative agencies.3 28

In

general application of the doctrine, some decisions point to the "local" nature of the determinations to be made, with the court abstaining to avoid

special" matters of a particular locality.3 29 The prerogatives of state sov-

ereignty are said to be of overriding concern where such "local" matters are

before state courts. But even a subject so clearly "local" in nature as eminent domain has resulted in conflicting decisions.

Abstention was in-

voked in one case because of the intimate involvement of eminent domain

with sovereign prerogative,3 30 and refused in another because eminent domain was felt to be no more a matter involving sovereign prerogative than

those in other situations when the court refused to abstain.3 3'

327. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 64, at 340
(Wright ed. 1960).
328. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943) (federal
court should abstain from issuing declaratory judgments in matters of state taxation);
Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940); Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935) (abstention proper in receivership proceeding where
state has its own procedure for liquidation of the corporation involved); Hawks v.
Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933) (diversity action, seeking injunction against state officials
to restrain interference with alleged perpetual franchise to operate toll bridge, dismissed to avoid unnecessary friction with state officials); Simmons v. Jones, 478 F.2d
321 (5th Cir. 1973) (abstention proper in suit to compel county jury commissioners to
perform their official duties in accordance with state statute); Liggett v. Green, 188
F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1951); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. America,
358 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 475 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973). See Martin v.
Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959) (abstention proper in state condemnation case); Morgan
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States, 446 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1971) (abstention proper where matters of state probate proceedings are at issue); Creel v.
City of Atlanta, 399 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1968); Duggins v. Hunt, 323 F.2d 746 (10th
Cir. 1963) (abstention dismissing requested declaratory judgment proper where federal
action would interfere with state's administration of assets of insolvent insurer).
But see, e.g., United States v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 439 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1971
(federal court need not abstain from deciding matters of state use tax where availability
of state court determination of the matters was in doubt).
329. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (19,51) (abstention proper where state commission's order regarding regulation of railroad could
have been appealed to a state court more familiar with the chiefly local factors involved); Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (federal court should abstain
and dismiss suit where specialized issue of proration orders in area of mineral rights
was a matter of purely local regulation).
330. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodeaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)
(court abstained by staying federal action pending state court construction of state
condemnation statute). Accord, Crawford v. Courtney, 451 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1971);
Creel v. City of Atlanta, 399 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1968); Euge v. Trantina. 298 F. Supp.
873 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1970); Joiner v. City of Dallas,
329 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1403 (1971).
331. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (federal
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Another possible basis for the application of the abstention doctrine,
though one whose uncertain existence is in need of clarification, is that of
abstention to avoid difficult questions of state law. 332 Since this means of
justifying abstention touches aspects of both the Pullman doctrine 333 and
834
the policy of non-interference with a state's agencies and local affairs,
there is considerable doubt whether it exists independently at all. This is
particularly true in light of Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,335 involving
a bondholders' diversity action that challenged the city's power to issue
bonds without referendum to its voters. Although the state law in question
was uncertain, the Court refused to abstain.3 36 Apart from the application
of the "Meredith doctrine, '337 where the state law in question has not been
construed or ruled upon, 33 8 the Pullman decision provides authority for invoking abstention.

court should not abstain from accepting diversity case filed pursuant to a state statute
allowing actions of ouster to challenge validity of the condemnation taking); accord,
Myrick v. Union Oil Co., 418 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1969).
The leading cases in this area have been the subject of considerable discussion.
For an attempt to reconcile the holdings in Thibodeaux and Allegheny, see Comment,
Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 240-50 (1959).
See also Note, 69 YALE L.J. 643 (1960).
332. See C. WiuGHr, FEDERAL CouRTs § 52, at 202 (2d ed. 1970).
333. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942)
(abstention proper in an action for injunction to prevent city's unconstitutional interference with plaintiff's use of a particular kind of milk container where state law was
unclear regarding whether city actually had power to prohibit containers).
334. See, e.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petrol. Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) (abstention
proper in bankruptcy proceeding where questions of state property raised by trustee
could have been resolved in state court).
335. 320 U.S. 228 (1943); accord, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963). See Wohl v. Keene, 476 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1973); AFA Distrib. Co. v.
Pearl Brewing Co., 470 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Stafos v. Jarvis, 477 F.2d
369, 372 (10th Cir. 1973).
336. 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-36
(1965); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 n.5 (1963); Sutton v. Leib,
342 U.S. 402, 410 (1952). But see Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074
(9th Cir. 1973); Warren v. Government Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 443 F.2d 624 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971).
337. This oft-cited opinion has become known as announcing the "Meredith doctrine." Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). As stated therein:
In the absence of some recognized public policy of defined principle guiding the
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its
non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts,
if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever
necessary to the rendition of a judgment. When such exceptional circumstances
are not present, denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the
answers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been
given by the highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional
act.
Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted).
338. See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972) (court abstained
where Michigan water pollution statute had not been construed by state courts);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (abstention proper where state statute af-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

43

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 5 [2022], No. 3, Art. 4

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:489

An adjunct to the abstention doctrine was established by the use of a
certification procedure first applied in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.33 9
The certification procedure applied in this action at law was pursuant to a
Florida statute 340 allowing a federal court of appeals to certify questions of
Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court held that the court of appeals should, "where a federal constitutional
question might be mooted thereby, [abstain and] . . .secure an authori-

'341
tive state court's determination of an unresolved question of its local law."
Despite initial enthusiasm over the certification procedure,3 42 it raises prob-

iems of expense and delay, of rendering quasi-advisory opinions, and of

dealing abstractly with concrete factual questions. 343 These difficulties have
caused one authority to comment:
[C]ertification is an undesirable innovation if it will lead to abrogation
of the Meredith doctrine.

If a federal court must defer to the state

fecting association seeking injunction had not yet been construed by state courts); A.F.
of L. v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) (abstention proper where state right-to-work
law not yet construed by state court); cf. Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934) (federal
court, without deciding constitutional issues raised, sustained injunction against a state
tax that was authorized by a state statute); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177
(1933) (federal court, without deciding on federal question, granted injunction of state
tax statute, holding it unconstitutional as construed by state courts).
339. 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
340. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1957). The statute provides:
The supreme court of this state may, by rule of court, provide that, when it
shall appear to the supreme court of the United States, to any circuit court of
appeals of the United States, or to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia,
that there are involved in any proceeding before it questions or propositions of
the laws of this state, which are determinative of the said cause, and there are
no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the supreme court of this state,
such federal appellate court may certify such questions or propositions of the laws
of this state to the supreme court of this state for instructions concerning such
questions or propositions of state law, which certificate the supreme court of this
state, by written opinion, may answer.
341. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). Other states have
since established procedures similar to that found in Florida. See, e.g., ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (Supp. 1973); HAWAIt REV. STAT. §§ 602-36, 602-37 (1968);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.60.010-2.60.030 (Supp. 1972).

342. See Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the
Florida Supreme Court and Its Import on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV.
413 (1962); Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court
Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959); Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 888 (1971 ,; McKusick,
Certification: A Procedure for Cooperation Between State and Federal Courts, 16 U.
MAINE L. REV. 33 (1964).
But -see Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law:
Deference to State Courts Versus Federal Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 419
(1960); Clark, FederalProceduralReform and States' Rights; to a More Perfect Union,
40 TEXAS L. REV. 211, 221-23 (1961); Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law:
An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 717

(1969).
343. See discussions in 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 64, at 323 (Wright ed., Supp. 1971); C. WRIGHT. FEDERAL. COI:RTS § 52,
at 204 (2d ed. 1970).
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the federal judiciary
court whenever a state issue in a case is difficult,
3 44

will no longer be able to function as a court.

Federal courts have resorted to abstention in a variety of other circumstances.3 45 While many of these decisions have been based on solid procedural grounds, 346 other cases "go beyond anything that has been sanc-

tioned by the Supreme Court, and beyond anything required by the ''de34
mands of federalism that are at the heart of the abstention doctrines.

1

To allow the courts to exercise wide discretion in the area of abstention is
undesirable, particularly where the discretionary decision invokes abstention. 348 For it has been deemed the duty of the federal courts, whenever

those questions of law nectheir jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide
3 49
judgment.
proper
a
of
rendition
the
to
essary
In addition to this general rule regarding jurisdiction, extensive delay is
often an undesirable ramification created by abstention. 3 0 It may be true
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 204 (2d ed. 1970).
345. Compare Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (dismissals based on forum non
conveniens), with Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939);
Amar v. Gamier Enterprise, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 211 (C.D. Cal. 1966) (abstention where
state court had already taken in rem jurisdiction), and Provident Tradesmens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) (court should abstain from granting declaratory judgment
where state action already pending in which all issues can be decided).
346. See, e.g., Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466
(1939), wherein the Court announced "the principle applicable to both federal and
state courts that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may maintain and
Accord, O'Hare Interexercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other .....
nat'l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1972).
347. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 205 (2d ed. 1970). The quotation refers to Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir.. 1949) (stay of federal court
action, pending state court decisions on similar actions), and P. Beiersdorf & Co. v.
McGohey, 187 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1951) (stay of federal court action ordered, because of crowded docket, pending state court declaratory judgment in a suit involving
same issues). "
See Comment, Fed348. Cf. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
eral Jurisdiction: Problems Involved in the Discretionary Use of the Abstention Doctrine, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 450. But see Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered,
37 TEXAS L. REV. 815, 825-27 (1959.).
349. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U:S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 824
(9th Cir. 1963). See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964); Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Frazier, 289 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835
(1961).
350. A natural result of abstention is prolonged litigation. One case took 9 years
for final adjudication. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F.
Other cases involvSupp. 993, 994 n.1 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd, 384 U.S. 885 (1966).
ing lengthy litigation include Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964) (7
years); City of Thibodeaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 373 F.2d 870, 871 n.2
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967) (10 years).
Another case lasted 5 years before it was dismissed for failure to state a justiciable
controversy. See Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor,
For the dismissal on remand, see American Fed'n of State,
353 U.S. 364 (1957).

344. C.
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that the policy "demands of federalism" are sufficient justification for the delay and expense which frequently result from abstention;5 51 but as a rule, it
is considered wiser policy to abstain only when the proper "special circum35 2
stances" exist.
Although the various doctrines of abstention previously considered never
have achieved any singular notoriety, the landmark cases of Pullman and
Meredith, and the principles they established, continue to have an indisputable influence on matters of abstention. There is, however, a plethora
of civil rights decisions from the past decade that have given rise to more
recent grounds for abstention vel non. Two major contemporary deci354
sions8 53 are being subjected to constant scrutiny and interpretation.
These cases are significant currents in a great stream of litigation, much of
which is in the area of criminal law, and nearly all of which involves assertions of constitutional rights. 35 5 Where constitutional rights are being
argued in a judicial proceeding, it almost follows a fortiori that the constitutionality of some law is being attacked in that proceeding. The problem
then, for courts determining whether to accept jurisdiction, is that of balancing individual constitutional rights against the policies inherent in "Our Federalism." And anyone who would knowledgeably witness these classic confrontations between the individual and the state must be familiar with the
brief record of the past.
The fountainhead of these civil rights rumblings was unquestionably Ex
parte Young.856 Although the Court enjoined the threatened proceedings,
it was carefully noted in the opinion that "the Federal court cannot, of
County & Municipal Employees v. Dawkins, 104 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 1958); cf. Leiter
Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 329 F.2d 85, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1964), vacated as moot,
381 U.S. 413 (1965).
351. 1 W. BARoN & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACIrCE & PROCEDURE § 64, at 344
(Wright ed. 1960).
352. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375-79 (1964); Silverman v. Browning, 359
F. Supp. 173, 176 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd, - U.S. -, 93 S. Ct. 1927, 36 L. Ed. 2d 406

(1973).
353. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), was the earlier of the two decisions. Probably the best work on the implications of this case is Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48

L. REV. 535 (1970).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the more recent decision, is one of six cases,
all handed down the same day, which dealt with matters of abstention. The others
are: Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). See Maraist, Federal Intervention in State Criminal
Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 1324 (1972).
354. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Lake Carriers' Ass'n v.
MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Cameron
v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
TEXAS

355.

Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Sig-

nificance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAs L. REV. 535 (1970).
356. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See notes 315-17 supra.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol5/iss3/4

46

Walsh: Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not Specifically Conferred

1973]

STUDENT SYMPOSIUM

course, interfere in a case where the proceedings were already pending in a
state court. '3 57 The Young rule was acknowledged in many subsequent de-9
35
cisions,3 58 but was found inapplicable in Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
where the Court refused equitable relief in a Young situation. Plaintiffs
were Jehovah's

Witnesses who, threatened

with criminal

prosecution,

brought suit to contest a city ordinance which prohibited solicitation of orders for merchandise without first procuring a license and paying a tax.
The Court had jurisdiction but refused to invoke it, finding that plaintiffs
failed to establish a cause of action in equity. 360 The opinion attempted to
clarify the circumstances under which relief would be granted by emphasizing an "irreparable injury" 3 61 test which, in this case, plaintiffs had failed
to meet.
The Douglas decision, however, had little deterrent effect on the civil
rights cases3 6 2 which began to evolve after the monumental decision of
Brown v. Board of Education.3 63 Although it was unclear as to what circumstances were necessary to obtain equitable relief from the federal courts,

it was at least apparent that the protection of individual constitutional rights
was more important than strict adherence to precedence in the abstention
357. Id. at 162.
358. See, e.g., Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926) (interference by federal
courts possible where state courts would not afford adequate protection); accord,
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935). In Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939), city officials were enjoined from enforcing unconstitutional ordinances
which threatened plaintiffs with criminal prosecution and deprived them of first amendment rights. There was evidence of unlawful searches and seizures and other acts
indicating harassment and bad faith.
359. 319 U.S. 157 (1943); accord, Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
360. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1943).
361. Id. at 163-64. The Court noted:
[T]he arrest by the federal courts of the processes of the criminal law within
the states, and the determination of questions of criminal liability under state law
by a federal court of equity, are to be supported only in a showing of danger of
irreparable injury "both great and immediate."
The Court distinguished Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) on the absence of harassment and other "exceptiohal circumstances." See also Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
312 U.S. 45 (1941).
For language presaging the "irreparable injury" criteria, see
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (19471).
362. See, e.g., Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956) (plaintiffs not required to pay tax before maintaining action to have an ordinance declared
unconstitutional, where the combination of circumstances made the threat of real and
lasting damage to the plaintiffs genuine and present); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Ala.), affd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (court held bus segregation statutes
unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement). Later cases from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit included United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962); Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 194 F. Supp.
182 (E.D. La.), a!f'd sub nom., Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961).
See also Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 939 (1965); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
363. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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areas. And, more to the point, first amendment rights of expression
were
'64
being asserted by litigants in an overwhelming number of cases.
The time was ripe 36 5 when Dombrowski v. Pfister366 emerged from the

torrent of civil rights litigation with the force of a geyser. Plaintiffs were
members of a civil rights group operating in Louisiana; defendants included the chairman of a state "Un-american Activities" committee and his
fellow committeemen. Following state court dismissal of arrests made pursuant to an illegal raid on plaintiffs' office and homes, plaintiffs feared,
and subsequently alleged, threatened prosecutions under Louisiana's "anticommunist" state statutes.36 7 Plaintiffs accordingly filed suit in federal
district court shortly before the grand jury was convened, 3 8 challenging the
constitutionality of the statutes and seeking injunctive relief. The court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a ground upon which relief
could be granted.369 The Supreme Court found the statutes to be overbroad and vague,370 and determined that threatened prosecutions under such
statutes would significantly impair, or have a "chilling effect" 3 71 upon, plain-

tiffs' exercise of their first amendment rights. The Court further noted that
the conduct of the defendants in harassing plaintiffs presented evidence of
bad faith in attempting to enforce the statutes. 372 Eschewing abstention,
364. For a discussion of the "super" protection afforded first amendment rights and
of the landmark decisions in the area of expression, see Maraist, Federal Injunctive
Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS
L. REv. 535, 552-55 (1970).
365. In Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), the Court declined to abstain
in the absence of "special circumstances," holding that abstention was not justified
here where the denial of constitutional rights of speech would result. Accord, Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Garvin v. Rosenan, 455 F.2d 233 (1972); Federal
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 435 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1970); Nicholson v. Board
of Comm'rs State Bar Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 48 (D.C. Ala. 1972).
366. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
367. Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:
358-:373 (Cum. Supp. 1969); Communist Propaganda Control Law, LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 14:390-:390.8 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
368. In light of a recent decision, Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498
(1972), the point in time separating "threatened" from "pending" proceedings becomes
an important issue. In Dombrowski, the convening of the grand jury marked the
"point of pendency" of the proceedings, and the federal district court action filed before that point in time was considered a suit to enjoin threatened proceedings.
369. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 564 (E.D. La. 1964).
370. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
For a discussion of the overbreadth and vagueness concepts, see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1964).
See also
Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance
of Dombrowski, 48 TExAs L. REV. 535, 555-60 (1971); Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
371. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487, 494 (1965).
See Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When
No State Prosecution Is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 875 n.10 (1972); Note,
The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
372. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965).
This evidence in the
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the Court enjoined enforcement of the unconstitutional statutes and estab373
lished criteria for such relief in the future.
In Dombrowski the majority carefully explained the decision within traditional policy considerations: Ex parte Young had recognized circumstances justifying federal interference in state criminal proceedings; 37 4 the
Anti-Injunction Statute 375 applied to pending, not threatened, prosecutions; 376 and Douglas v. City of Jeannette37 7 did not dictate otherwise since
special circumstances involving threatened irreparable injury had been
3 78
shown in Dombrowski.
The Court considered the issue of abstention in broad language:
We hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the
present one where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face
as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities.
In these circumstances, to abstain is to subject those affected
to the uncertainties and vagaries of criminal prosecution, whereas the
reasons for the vagueness doctrine in the area of expression demand
no less than freedom
from prosecution prior to a construction adequate
3 79
to save the statute..
It was not clear from the opinion, however, whether a justifiable attack on
a statute as violative of constitutional rights would be sufficient in itself to
preclude abstention, or whether a showing of bad faith harassment was
also necessary to the decision. Nor was it clear whether the Dombrowski
doctrine could conceivably apply even where state proceedings were already
pending. What was clear, however, was that the troublesome abstention/
acceptance dichotomy regarding jurisdiction was likely to be resolved in
favor of acceptance where a "chilling effect" on first amendment rights was
threatened under an existing law found to be unconstitutional on its face
3 80
or unconstitutional in its application.
The subsequent decisions of Cameron v. Johnson3 81 and Zwickler v.
Koota 382 clarified some of the problems raised in Dombrowski. Although
Dombrowski case was revived and given much attention in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971).
373. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965).
374. Id. at 483-84.
375. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
376. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
377. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
378. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
379. Id. at 489, 492.
380. Id. at 486-87.
381. This case first came before the Supreme Court in 381 U.S. 741 (1965). On
remand the lower court considered the case in light of Dombrowski and dismissed.
262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966),,alf'd, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
382. 389 U.S. 241 (1967). On remand the lower court found plaintiff's case was
still alive despite the fact that the politician who had triggered plaintiff's complaint
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the Court in the Cameron case found no evidence of harassment and held
the picketing statute in issue constitutional, they indicated that either bad

faith harassment (involving a constitutionally valid statute) directed at limiting plaintiff's first amendment rights, or the enforcement (even absent bad
faith) of a statute justifiably attacked as unconstitutional on its face would
be grounds for equitable relief. 3 3 Zwickler demonstrated the applicability of the Dombrowski doctrine to cases seeking declaratory judgments, and
further noted that a declaratory judgment might still be granted by a court

in a suit where injunctive relief was refused.3 8 4 One limiting aspect of
these later cases was that virtually all of the lower court decisions refused
to extend Dombrowski protection to claims other than those involving freedom of expression. 85 Yet the crucial interrelated issues remained unanswered-whether Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 380 was an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Statute, and whether equitable relief could be granted
against pending state proceedings.

In February of 1971, six decisions were handed down from the Supreme
Court which had a "chilling effect" on the Dombrowski doctrine.3 87 The
most informative of the six, Younger v. Harris,3 88 involved a California syn-

dicalism statute under which one of the plaintiffs was being prosecuted in
pending proceedings. Three other plaintiffs had intervened, alleging they
felt "inhibited" or "uncertain" about the effect that enforcement of the
statute would have on their free expression. Without regard to the alleged
unconstitutionality of the statute, the Court held that abstention was proper
was no longer in politics. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held the controversy moot.
290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd sub nom., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103

(1969).
383. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-18 (1968).
384. 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967). But the following year the Court affirmed per
curiam a lower court decision which held, inter alia, that a court may not grant a
declaratory judgment where injunctive relief was refused. Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp.
538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 361 (1968).
385. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 535, 580 (1970).
386. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Because of its all-inclusive applicability, this
provision of the act has been popular with more civil rights litigants than has any other
section. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
thc, United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
387. The cases, all decided on February 23, 1971, have been frequently referred to
as the "February Sextet." See Le Flore v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1971)
(concurring opinion by Goldberg, J.).
The six cases are: Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401
U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200
(1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
388. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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because "of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin
3 9
pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances."

8

Although the Court's opinion first announced a desire to avoid ruling on
cases where criminal prosecution was merely threatened under an allegedly
unconstitutional statute,8 90 nevertheless it went on to restrict the criteria
for relief set out in Dombrowski. The intervening plaintiffs were not regarded as proper parties since they had alleged no immediate threat of
prosecution, and consequently there was no genuine controversy as to
them.39 1 Reviewing the equitable tradition of non-interference in state
criminal prosecutions, together with policies of comity, the Court resurrected language from an earlier case3 92 and adopted it as the touchstone
of the Younger test:

[W]hen absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights
courts of the United States have power to enjoin state officers from in-

stituting criminal actions. But this may not be done, except under
where the danger of irreparable loss is
extraordinary circumstances,
3 93
both great and immediate.

By way of example, an "irreparable injury" would involve more than "the
cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution . . . ,,394 Additionally, the words "brought in good faith"
could apparently be added to the preceding language, for the opinion noted

that the existence of bad faith harassment was determinative in Dombrowski.3 9 5

The Court also discussed situations involving a finding that a statute,
389. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). In a footnote to this holding, the Court added
that abstention would similarly be in order where a declaratory judgment was being
sought. Id. at 41 n.2. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
390. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). The Court noted: "We express
no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no
prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun."
391. Id. at 42.
Plaintiff dealers in cotton commodi392. Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
ties, threatened with prosecution, challenged the validity of a state statute declaring
unlawful certain agreements for purchase or sale, for future delivery, of certain commodities. The Court refused to enjoin, holding that plaintiffs had failed to show
danger of great and immediate irreparable loss. See note 322 supra.
393. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971), quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240, 243 (1926) (emphasis added).
394. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
395. The Court noted:
These circumstances [of bad faith harassment in Dombrowski], as viewed by the
Court sufficiently establish the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that
associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had
always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention.
Id. at 48 (emphasis added). The words "the kind of" imply that other irreparable
injury sufficient to warrant equitable relief may be shown, absent bad faith harassment.
See note 398 infra.
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unconstitutional "on its face," would have a "chilling effect" on a plaintiff's
freedom of expression and noted, notwithstanding apparently contrary dicta
in Dombrowski, that such a finding would not be sufficient grounds for
equitable relief.3 96 Having given a "flagrantly violative statute" as another
example of sufficient "irreparable injury,"3 97 the Court also held that the
possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" did not justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it. Applying this to the fact
situation before it, the Court found that plaintiff had failed to give evidence
of bad faith harassment or any other unusual circumstance that would call
9
for equitable relief A 8
The other decisions making up the "February Sextet"3 99 were essentially
variations on the theme stated in Younger. 400 But of more immediate interest is the development now being heard as the federal courts at all levels
interpret the theme. It is already apparent that the Younger cases won't
402
dictate abstention 4 0 1 any more than Dombrowski dictated injunctions.
As will be seen, the Dombrowski doctrine obviously fits more situations than
its "bearded, one-eyed, red-haired, man-with-a-limp" facts 40 3 might have
suggested, and the Younger decision seems destined to be less than a "major
retreat" 40 4 from Dombrowski.
396. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
397. Id. at 53. The Court suggested the possibility that there may be extraordinary
circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury might be shown even absent the
usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. By way of example, the Court cited
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941): It is of course conceivable that a statute
might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an
effort might be made to apply it.
398. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
399. This much-used description was apparently coined by Judge Goldberg in Le
Flore v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
400. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) (applied the Younger holding to declaratory judgments); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (held injunction should not
issue where none of plaintiffs were being prosecuted or even threatened under allegedly unconstitutional statutes); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) (held injunction should not issue where state officials were acting in good faith to enforce a local
ordinance which was under attack); see Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v.
Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
401. See note 413 infra.
402. See note 373 supra.
403. The implication of this phrase, coined by a recent commentator, is that the
fact situation in Dombrowski was singular and narrow. See Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48
But the recent case of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
TEXAS L. REv. 535, 536 (1970).
225 (1972) suggests that relief will be granted in "threatened"-as in Dombrowskisituations.
404. Professor Wright seems to feel that Younger represents a major retreat from
Dombrowski. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 203 (Supp. 1972). But see
notes 410-13 and accompanying text infra.
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In the May 1972 decision of Lake Carriers' Association v. MacMullan,40

5

owners of cargo vessels operating on the Great Lakes challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan Water Pollution Act. 40 6 Since the act had not
been construed by any of the state courts, the Supreme Court abstained;
but in dicta there was comment on the limited scope of the Younger deci-

sion.407 The opinion revived the threatened/pending prosecution dualitythe significant distinction between Dombrowski and Younger.

Mr. Justice

Brennan, author of the Dombrowski opinion, wrote for the majority in Lake
Carriers,and the decision proved to be ominous.
One month later, after years of postponing decision on the issue, the Supreme Court finally ruled on the relationship between Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act 40° and the Anti-Injunction Statute. 40 9 In Mitchum v. Foster 410 a unanimous Court agreed that the Anti-Injunction Statute, which

serves as a bar to most injunctions against state court proceedings, did not
apply to litigation seeking equitable relief under section 1983.411 The
Court reasoned that section 1983, "clearly creating a federal right or remedy
enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope
'412
only by the stay of a state court proceeding.

Through his concurring remarks in Mitchum, Chief Justice Burger undoubtedly sensed the aura of uncertainty which the majority's opinion
seemed to leave around Younger:
In the context of pending state criminal proceedings, we held in
Younger v. Harris that these principles [of equity, comity, and fed-

eralism] allow a federal court properly to issue an injunction in only
narrow class of circumstances. We have not yet reached or decided

405. 406 U.S. 498 (1972); accord, Hogge v. Members of City Council, 482 F.2d
575, 578 (4th Cir. 1973); cf. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
406. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 500 (1972). On the authority of Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), the Court vacated and remanded
pending state court rulings on the statute in question. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1972).
407. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972).
The Court
remarked: "The decisions there [in Younger] were premised on considerations of
equity practice and comity in our federal system that have little force in the absence of
a pending state proceeding."
408. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For text of the statute, see note 386 supra.
409. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See also note 313 supra.
410. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). The recent case of Gibson v. Berryhill, - U.S. -,
93 S. Ct. 1689, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1973), involved an action brought under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice White,
made it clear that the Mitchum decision "held only that a district court was not absolutely barred by statute from enjoining a state court proceeding when called upon
to do so in a § 1983 suit." Id. at -, 93 S. Ct. at 1695, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 496. The
opinion went on to reaffirm the "established principles of equity, comity and federalism" and to discuss proper circumstances for abstention.
411. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229 (1972).
412. Id. at 238. This test reflects the reasoning of Mr. Justice Reed's vigorous dissent in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 141-54 (1941).
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exactly how great a restraint is imposed by these principles on a federal court asked to enjoin state civil proceedings.413
Although the distinction between civil and criminal cases had occasionally
been discussed before, 414 it is now apparently of greater significance, 415 and
future decisions will likely mention the import of the civil or criminal nature of the action 416 on the thorny problem of whether to apply the "great
and immediate irreparable harm" test.
Since the Mitchum decision removes the jurisdictional barrier created by
the Anti-Injunction Statute in actions seeking equitable relief, it follows
that where constitutional rights are being asserted under section 1983, the
prohibitions of the Anti-Injunction Statute will no longer constitute independent grounds for abstention. Although the Younger decision is still valid,
its requirements for a showing of bad faith harassment or immediate irreparable injury apparently will control only when the state court proceedings involved are both pending and criminal. In the absence of a pending state criminal prosecution, federal courts will be less willing to abstain
from accepting jurisdiction in cases arising under section 1983.
Many of the decisions since Younger have applied the criteria established
in that decision. In cases involving ongoing state criminal proceedings,
equitable relief has been denied absent a showing of bad faith harassment 4 "7
or of irreparable injury. 418 Yet other courts, finding the Younger criteria
413. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 244 (1972) (citation omitted).
414. See, e.g., Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230, 1232 (5th Cir. 1972), where
the court said:
We believe, however, that application of the principles of Younger should not depend upon such labels as "civil" or "criminal," but rather should be governed by
analysis of the competing interests that each case presents.
415. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, -, 92 S. Ct. 2610, 2614, 34 L. Ed. 2d
15, 19-20 (1972).
416. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Florida replevin statute was enjoined by federal court; dissent argued Younger should apply). But see Palaio v.
McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972) where the court said:
We thus pose a limited answer to the question expressly reserved in Younger
.. by holding that, where plaintiff is unable to prove the existence of "special
circumstances," the principles of Younger bar federal intervention in a state civil
proceeding that is an integral part of a state's enforcement of its criminal laws.
Id. at 1233.
417. See Canal Theatres, Inc. v. Murphy, 473 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1973) (abstention
ordered in suit by theatre operator for declaratory judgment regarding constitutionality
of city licensing requirement); Eames v. Pitcher, 468 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1972) (no bad
faith shown in ongoing state murder prosecution); Hodson v. Stabler, 444 F.2d 533
(3d Cir. 1971) (individual charged with flag desecration not entitled to equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional statute); Star-Satellite, Inc. v. Rosetti, 441 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1971) (no injunction allowed against police seizure of films while proceedings pending for violation of obscenity laws); Eve Productions, Inc. v. Shannon,
439 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1971) (injunction refused where return of seized film sought).
418. See, e.g., Hunt v. Rodriguez, 462 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972) (no irreparable
injury shown where raided bookstores either remained open or were to be reopened
soon); cf. Scott v. Hill, 449 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1971) (convict's claim, that allowing
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satisfied, have issued injunctions despite pending proceedings. In Shaw v.
Garrison419 an injunction was granted to the plaintiff, whom defendant Garrison was prosecuting for perjury in a pending trial. The court found evidence of bad faith harassment in the continuing accusations brought upon

plaintiff by defendant in the years following President Kennedy's assassi4 20
nation.
Where there is no pending state prosecution at the time of filing a suit in
federal court, many United States Courts of Appeal have not required the
abstention criteria established in Younger. In Anderson v. Nemetz, 4 2' plain-

tiff was held to have standing to challenge an Arizona vagrancy statute,
although he wasn't presently under arrest. Evidence showed he had previously defended himself against charges under the statute, that the state
had declared an intention to continue to enforce the statute against him,
his appeal to be heard by state appellate court, whose judges were from districts which
were not properly apportioned, violated his constitutional rights, failed to allege irreparable injury). Younger's proclamation of the insufficiency of a "chilling effect" was
even followed where the "ongoing proceedings" were those of the military. Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972). The
court abstained from reviewing a transfer order which, evidence tended to show, was
issued against plaintiff serviceman after plaintiff arranged for anti-war protest incidents.
Noting the actual harassment found here by the trial court, the dissent remarked eloquently:
Even a very little chill on a very big right is too much. A transfer to Texas today
could be a transfer to Hue tomorrow. A transfer can be just as much "punishment" as retention in the Army.
The majority would await a "stronger case" to intervene to protect a serviceman's First Amendment rights. I suspect that there were those who counselled
waiting for a higher tax to throw the tea into Boston Harbor, or suggested to
Andrew Hamilton that he wait for a client with a better case than John Peter
Zenger's to argue for free expression. I would, rather, agree with Coke's aphorism:
"No restraint be it ever so little, but is imprisonment, and foreign employment is
a kind of honourable banishment."
Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
419. 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972). Accord, Krahm
v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972) (injunction granted where city had filed
more than 100 prosecutions against plaintiffs under obscenity laws, of which 90 were
still pending, despite acquittals in first 11 cases); Duncan v. Perez, 445 F.2d 557 (5th
Cir. 1971) (evidence showed district attorney maintained simple battery prosecutions
against plaintiff for purposes of harassment and in bad faith). Compare Reed v.
Giarrusso, 462 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiffs, arrested under breach of peace
ordinances, had standing to challenge ordinance notwithstanding prosecutions had
been dropped, where plaintiffs alleged bad faith harassment and fear of future prosecutions).
420. The court declared in Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972) that:
We hold, as the language of Younger makes clear, that a showing of bad faith or
harassment is equivalent to a showing of irreparable injury for purposes of the
comity restraints defined in Younger, because there is a federal right to be free
from bad faith prosecutions. Irreparable injury need not be independently established.
Id. at 120.
421. 474 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
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and that the state had made several hundred arrests in his locality under
the same statute over a 3 year period. 422 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit found that there was a sufficient "threat" to justify equitable
relief.

4 23

In Wulp v. Corcoran,4 24 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit distinguished Younger on the pending/threatened issue. The court found
defendant city officials had threatened plaintiffs with arrests and prosecutions under a city ordinance which required registration for a permit prior
to distributing printed material in the Harvard Square area of Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Finding sufficient threat of impending prosecution was
shown by the complaint, the court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.4 25
The future of the abstention doctrine may be more predictable today than
it has been since prior to the Dombrowski decision in 1965. In pending
criminal proceedings, the Younger criteria will be applied. Where prosecution is merely threatened, however, it will be a factual determination as to
whether there is an acute, live case or controversy sufficient to entitle plaintiff to equitable relief. In such litigation, Mitchum seems to indicate that
the presence vel non of the Younger criteria of bad faith, harassment, and
great and immediate irreparable injury will be considerations to be weighed,
but will not be conclusive in deciding whether to accept jurisdiction.
Whether Younger will be applied to pending civil proceedings is presently
unclear, but at least one Supreme Court decision implies that it will not be
420

controlling in a civil action.
The civil-criminal distinction has remained unanswered, but it is likely
that it will be applied in future decisions 427 to avoid the rigid test required
422. Id. at 816. The court noted specifically: "There are sound policy reasons for
holding that the abstention doctrine enunciated in Younger and its companion cases
should not be applied in cases where no state prosecution is pending." Id. at 819;
accord, Thorns v. Heffernan, 473 F.2d 478, 483 (2d Cir. 1973); Gay v. Board of
Registration Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 879, 885 (6th Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d
1343, 1347 (3d Cir. 1971); Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (2d Cir. 1971).
423. Anderson v. Nemetz, 474 F.2d 814, 820 n.2 (9th Cir. 1973).
424. 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972).
425. Id. at 834. But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).

426. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Some jurisdictions have argued against
any civil-criminal distinction, so far as application of the Younger principles are concerned. See Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (5th Cir. 1972); Hobbs v.
Thompson, 448 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1971). As a consequence, problems of what to
"label" a case have arisen. In cases involving disciplinary proceedings brought against
attorneys, for example, two decisions arrived at contrary appellations. Compare Polk
v. State Bar of Texas, 480 F.2d 998, 1002 (5th Cir. 1973) (dicta indicated that proceedings by Grievance Committee of State Bar of Texas are civil in nature), with
Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972)
(disciplinary proceeding against a member of state's bar is comparable to a criminal
rather than to a civil proceeding).
427. See Chief Justice Burger's quotation at note 413 and accompanying text supra.
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by Younger. As a matter of policy, it is a valid distinction, for the state
has a considerable investment of its resources in pending criminal prosecutions. Such an investment is entitled to the plenary protection of comity
and of the other principles governing "Our Federalism."
Although the role of the federal courts has been steadily increasing during
the past century, 42 8 the abstention doctrine still operates in recurring key
circumstances to prevent improper assertion of federal powers, and to preserve the delicate balance of authority necessary to the health of our federal system.
ORDERS MADE WHILE DETERMINING JURISDICTION

It is well established that a federal court has authority to determine
whether or not it may lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter of the litigation. 429 There has been controversy, however,
concerning the effect of injunctions and temporary restraining orders issued
430
pending such jurisdictional determinations.
In determining the ultimate validity of an order, the issue of jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the case by the issuing court is a
vital question. Federal courts are afforded authority to determine jurisdiction, as was clearly developed in United States v. Shipp.4 3 1 In 1905,
Johnson, a black man from Hamilton County, Tennessee, was convicted of
raping a white woman and was sentenced to death. Johnson petitioned the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, seeking a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that the proceedings in his trial were invalid because Negroes had
432
been excluded from the grand and petit juries. The petition was denied,
and on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Johnson contended that
the act of excluding blacks from the jury deprived him of his constitutional
rights without due process of law. The Court issued an order staying all
proceedings against the prisoner pending the appeal of his conviction.
When notification of the order reached Shipp, the county sheriff who
held custody of Johnson, he reacted by leaving the prisoner in the jailhouse
virtually unprotected. The same evening, Johnson was removed from jail
428. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231-42 (1972).
429. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939); United States v.
Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir.

1935); O'Hearne v. United States, 66 F.2d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Schwartz v.
United States, 217 F. 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1914); Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.,
205 F. 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1913).

430. See Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction & Collateral Attack: October Term,
1939, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006 (1940).

431.

203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).

432. Id. at 571. The petition was denied at a hearing and Johnson was ordered to
be kept in the custody of the Hamilton County sheriff, pending an appeal to the

United States

Supreme

Court.
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and executed by a mob, acting with the tacit aid and support of Shipp.
Because of his failure to protect the prisoner, the sheriff was charged with
contempt of the order staying all proceedings. In his defense, Shipp contended that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to rule in the habeas corpus
proceeding because there was no issue concerning the construction of the
United States Constitution. 43 3 Shipp believed that exclusion of blacks from
juries was not a matter involving the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Shipp, refused defendant's
argument and appropriately summarized the extent of a federal court's
authority to determine its own jurisdiction:
It has been held, it is true, that orders made by a court having no
jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt. But even if the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain Johnson's petition, and if this Court had no jurisdiction of
the appeal, this court, and this court alone, could decide that such was

the law. It and it alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether
the case was properly before it. Until its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had the authority from the necessity of
the case to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition, just as the state court
434 was bound to refrain from
further proceedings until the same time.
The real impact of the statement is that the authority to make an order
staying proceedings springs from the necessity of the case. 43 5 Therefore,
it can be inferred that Justice Holmes decided that the matter- of jurisdiction
should initially not interfere with an order preserving the status quo in an
emergency situation, until the jurisdictional facts are resolved.
Confusion remained in the area of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction
as clearly manifested by the case of Ex parte Young. 436 The Court in
Young failed to consider whether any authority to determine jurisdiction lay
with the court itself, and instead, discussed orders that were considered absolutely void based on a lack of jurisdiction. 437 There was a total failure to
433. In re Lennon, 150 U.S. 393, 398 (1893).
434. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906) (emphasis added), citing In
re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1887); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1884); Ex parte Rowland,
104 U.S. 604 (1881) for the proposition that orders made by a court without jurisdiction may be disregarded with impunity, and Mansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) for the proposition that the court itself must make the determination if the matter is properly before it. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1935).
435. Justice. Holmes in his opinion cited Mansfield, C. & L. Mich. Ry. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379 (1883). The reasoning is imperfect since Mansfield only discusses instances wherein jurisdiction has already been determined and gives instructions on how
a court should deal with an appeal when jurisdiction has been mistakenly assumed.
436. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
437. The Court in making that determination noted:
Where contempt consists of violation of an order or decree of a court, the commitment will be sustained unless it is found that the order or decree was absolutely
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even consider the doctrine espoused 3 years earlier in Shipp.43 8 In fact, it
was 1935 before the Shipp doctrine on jurisdiction was reaffirmed in Locke
v. United States.439 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that
if jurisdiction is unequivocally lacking, a temporary injunction or any other
order of such a court is void. If there is merely doubtful jurisdiction, however, it is the duty of that court itself to investigate the matter and any order
made to maintain the status quo of the litigants will receive special consideration.440 This is clearly a restated version of the holding of Shipp with
emphasis on an order maintaining the status of the parties receiving unique
treatment. Four years later, the Supreme Court in Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co.44 1 noted that the rule stating a judgment is always a nullity
if jurisdiction is totally lacking can no longer be broadly asserted. 4 42 The
Court held that, except in case of plain usurpation, a court has jurisdiction
443
to determine its own jurisdiction.
With this firm rule that a federal court has jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction unequivocally established, 444 the question still remained as to how
orders made by a court with self-determined jurisdiction were to be treated.
A Supreme Court case, Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co.,445 provided
the basis for contempt citations in many later cases. Justice Lamar, faced
with the problem of parties disobeying an order which they felt was invalid
for lack of federal jurisdiction, stated:
If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which
have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside,
then are the courts impotent and what the Constitution now fittingly
calls44the
judicial power of the United States would be a mere mock6

ery.

Referring back to Locke v. United States,447 the Court emphasized that the
grant of an injunction was not to be questioned except by proper appeal and
must not be tested by willful disobedience. 448 The Court emphatically
void because the court was wholly without jurisdiction or power to make it.

Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
438. The Supreme Court totally ignored the doctrine of Shipp, and based its desion on three cases that had been modified by the Shipp decision. Cf. In re Coy,
127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte Watkins,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
439. 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1935).
440. id. at 159.
441. 308 U.S.66 (1939).
442. Id. at 78.
443. Accord, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403 (1940);
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 176 (1938).
444. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939); United States v.
Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
445. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
446. Id. at 450.
447. 75 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1935).
448. Id. at 159; see O'Heame v. United States, 66 F.2d 933, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1933);
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stated that such willful disobedience, of even an injunction issued by a court
which was subsequently determined to be without jurisdiction, is punishable
449

as contempt.
This contempt distinction was later clarified by the decision in United
States v. United Mine Workers of America4 0 involving a Union-called
strike of a nationalized coal mine. The Government brought suit and pending a determination of the workers' right to strike, the United States requested and obtained a federal district court injunction against the strike.
The union contended that the injunction was void for lack of federal court
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The union's basis for this contention
was the Norris-La Guardia Act 451 which provides that no federal court
will have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or injunction in any matter that concerns a labor dispute. 4 52 On this basis, the workers ignored the
injunction and stopped work.
The Supreme Court, in what it termed unequivocal language45 3 condemned this action, citing Shipp as its principal authority 454 and concluding
that the disobedience of the order by the Union was punishable as criminal
contempt. 455 By specifying that the punishment be for criminal contempt
alone, the Court distinguished this disobedience from violations which result
in civil contempt. The Court in Nye v. United States,456 citing their earlier
decision in McCrone v. United States,457 held that "a contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes
of the complainant and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against
Schwartz v. United States, 217 F. 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1914); Brougham v. Oceanic
Steam Nay. Co., 205 F. 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1913).
449. Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1935); see American
Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 211 (1921); Patton v. United
States, 288 F. 812, 815 (4th Cir. 1923).
450. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
451. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
452. The Act has been held to deny federal courts jurisdiction to issue an injunction
against labor strikes. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
346 F.2d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 1965); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Local No. 721 v.
Central Ry., 229 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1956); W.L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6, 9 (5th Cir. 1954); Texas Pac.-Mo. Pac. Terminal R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 232 F. Supp. 33, 34 (E.D. La. 1964); Merchants
Refrigerating Co. v. Warehouse Union, Local No. 6, 213 F. Supp. 177, 178 (N.D.
Cal. 1963).
453. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 290 (1947).
454. id. at 290.
455. Id. at 293; accord, Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 183 (1922); see Russell v.
United States, 86 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1936); Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157,
159 (5th Cir. 1935); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930); Schwartz
v. United States, 217 F. 866 (4th Cir. 1914); Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.,
205 F. 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1913). See also O'Hearne v, United States, 66 F.2d 933,
936 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
456. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
457. 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939).
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45 9
the public. 45 8 This distinction was also drawn in Carter v. United States461
460
Ex parte Fisk
which explained the contrary rulings of In re Sawyer,

and Ex parte Rowland,462 by stating that what was involved in those cases
was civil contempt which should properly be dropped when jurisdiction is
4 63
found lacking.
Criminal contempt proceedings are brought to preserve the authority, dignity and integrity of the court and to punish offenders for disobedience of
its orders. 464 The significance of the Mine Workers decision was the reason-

ing that even if the order irself was set aside on appeal, the criminal contempt conviction would be preserved. 46 5

The Court went as far as to say

that even if the entire action on which the case is based becomes moot,

the criminal contempt will stand. 466 This portion of the Mine Workers de467
cision has been applied with great consistency in recent cases.
As Professor Wright notes, the long range effect of the Mine Workers

decision is unknown. 468

A careful analysis of the litigation from Shipp

through Mine Workers reveals that the doctrine espoused in Mine Workers

can be applied with certainty only to prohibitive orders that seek to pre-

serve the status quo. 469 The Court in Shipp speaks in terms of "orders to
458. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42 (1941). See also Penfield Co. v. SEC,
330 U.S. 585 (1946); Mac Neil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1956);
Walling v.Crane, 158 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1946); Fenton v.Walling, 139 F.2d 608,
609 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 104 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir.
1939).
459. 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943).
460. 124 U.S. 200 (1888). Contempt citations for this series of three cases
were dismissed when it was determined that the courts involved lacked jurisdiction in
the causes of action. The cases can be distinguished from Carter v. United States,
135 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1943) and from United States v. United Mine Workers, 300
U.S. 258 (1947) in that the parties were cited for contempt for disobeying a judgment
and not an order of the court.
461. 113 U.S. 713 (1885).
462. 104 U.S. 604 (1881).
463. Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d 850, 860 (5th Cir. 1943).
464. O'Mally v. United States, 128 F.2d 676, 683 (8th Cir. 1942). See also Cliett
v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Auerbach,; 165 F.2d
713, 715 (2d Cir. 1948); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (lst Cir. 1946).
465. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 300 U.S. 258, 294 (1947).
See also Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887); Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank
Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1936); S.Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co.,
191 F. 208, 210 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1911).
466. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947).
See also Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 451 (1911).
467. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948); Heyman v.
Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1973); Stewart v.
Dunn, 363 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665,
667 (2d Cir. 1963). Contra, Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Dunn v.
United States, 388 F.2d 511, 513 (10th Cir. 1968).
468. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 52 (2d ed. 1970).
469. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947);
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preserve the existing conditions, '4 70 Locke refers to orders made "only to
control the status pending the inquiry" and noted this type of order "stands
upon a special basis."' 471 In reaching its decision in Mine Workers the Su47 2
preme Court took special note of the language in Carter v. United States:
"Pending a decision on a doubtful question of jurisdiction, the District Court
was held to have power to maintain the status quo and punish violation as
contempt. '473 The Court further explicitly stated that the district court
had the authority to preserve the status quo while making its own determi47 4
nation about jurisdiction.
Two vague areas of application remain with regard to mandatory orders
and the effect the rule has on state courts. Several recent Supreme Court
cases have refused to extend the Mine Workers rule to orders issuing from
state courts. 475 Additionally, one one case has allowed a criminal contempt
to stand for violation of a mandatory order by a court that lacked jurisdiction. 476 It is doubtful that the doctrine should be or will be extended into
either of these areas.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion it may be said that there are few, if any, simple answers to
the complex issues of implied federal jurisdiction, and also to the converse
issues of rejection of cases in what would seem to be instances of express
federal jurisdiction. It can be noted, however, that within their limited
means, the federal courts have been able to develop some jurisdictional interpretations of the Constitution which, when necessary, either expand or
restrict its few and simple words. And with good reason.
Needless relitigation is avoided through the proper exercise of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction. Removal jurisdiction allows the defendant an opportunity to obtain a federal hearing when his federal rights are in issue or
when he can qualify in a diversity situation. Additionally, recourse may be
had in the federal courts when state officers act under invalid state laws.
On the other hand, through the Anti-Injunction Statute and its judicial inUnited States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906); United States v. Locke, 75 F.2d 157
(5th Cir. 1935).

470. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).

471. Locke v. United States, 75 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1935).
472. 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943).

473. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 292 (1947).
See also Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 68 (1939).
.474. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947).
475. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967); In re Green
369 U.S. 689, 692 (1962); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
340 U.S. 383, 397 (1951).
476. Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1964). A mandatory order

to testify was violated and the contempt citation was upheld even though the jurisdiction
of the court was questionable.
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terpretation, as well as through the courts' own development of the doctrine
of abstention, a certain balance is maintained between federal and state
interests.
Although the growth of federal jurisdiction has been uneven, and at
times inconsistent, it must be remembered that notwithstanding all their authority to adjudicate cases, the courts are powerless to determine which cases
will come before them. The courts can only decide, or refuse to decide, the
cases that individuals determine to file. Lacking any general legislative
power, limited to action only upon cases before them, the law, as developed by the courts, must necessarily reflect the issues considered important
by the litigants.
Finally, it is interesting to note that throughout our unparalleled growth
as a nation, of which the growth of our federal courts is but one reflection,
our sense of individual statehood has not diminished. State governments
and state courts also continue to grow and flourish. The American dual
system of government continues to grow, with the courts innovating and
adapting to changing conditions. While our Constitution remains a sound
and viable basic law which has not significantly changed in appearance,
it too, through court interpretation, has grown and adapted through the
years. And in the narrow area of federal court jurisdiction discussed above
in great detail, the overall developments to date appear to be in keeping
477
with Justice Marshall's mandate not to do violence to our Constitution.
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